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FALSE CONFLICTS AND INTERSTATE
PRECLUSION: MOVING BEYOND A
WOODEN READING OF THE FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT STATUTE
SANFORD N. CA UST-ELLENBOGEN *
INTRODUCTIONT HE full faith and credit clause of the Constitution1 and the full faith
and credit statute2 govern the manner in which judgments rendered
in one state are recognized and enforced in sister states.3 Recently, the
Supreme Court appears to have adopted a reading of the full faith and
credit statute that requires state or federal courts to give a state court
judgment the same preclusive effect as the rendering court would.4 The
Court appears to derive its reading from the plain language of the full
faith and credit statute.5 It is far from clear, however, that a "plain read-
ing" of the full faith and credit statute is either necessary or desirable.
When a court is asked to recognize a prior judgment in an ongoing
proceeding, it must make a series of determinations about the quality and
* Assistant Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.A. 1974, State
University of New York at Albany; M.C.R.P. 1977, Harvard University; J.D. 1985, New
York University. Daniel Chow, Lawrence Herman, Michael Kindred and John Kozyris
provided many useful comments and suggestions that improved this Article. Joseph
Mulligan and Jean Robertson provided excellent research assistance.
1. The full faith and credit clause provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. Const. art. IV,
§ 1.
2. The full faith and credit statute provides that the legislative acts, and the records
and judicial proceedings of any court, of any state, territory or possession of the United
States "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
3. The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws distinguishes between the recogni-
tion of judgments and the enforcement of judgments. See Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws §§ 93-98 (1971) (recognition of foreign judgments); id. §§ 99-102
(enforcement of foreign judgments). A judgment is said to be enforced when relief is
granted solely on the basis of the prior judgment. See id. at 302-03. All other situations
in which a prior judgment is given some preclusive effect in a subsequent litigation in-
volve the recognition of the prior judgment. This Article uses the term recognition to
describe the entire range of possible preclusive effects of a prior judgment, including the
enforcement of the judgment.
4. See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,
386 (1985); Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984);
Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 101 (1980). BeforeAllen v. McCurry, the Court often addressed judgment recognition
issues without reference to the preclusion law of the state of rendition. See Shreve, Pre-
clusion andFederal Choice of Law, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1209, 1228 n.107 (1986) (citing cases).
5. See Marrese, 470 U.S. at 380-86.
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content of the prior judgment and the effect that the judgment should
have in the ongoing proceeding. These determinations are shaped by an
assessment of several factors including fairness to the litigants in the pro-
ceedings, effectuation of the substantive policies of the forum and effi-
cient use of court resources. When the prior judgment is rendered by a
different court system than the one in which recognition is sought, an
additional level of concerns is added: a choice of law question is
presented with regard to the appropriate rules of preclusion. The na-
tion's courts need choice of law rules that address the federal concerns
that prompted the framers to adopt the full faith and credit clause and
that consider, to the extent possible, the interest of the states in which the
judgment is rendered and recognized in the operation of their court
systems.
The effect of the Supreme Court's reading of the full faith and credit
statute is to impose a particular choice of law rule in situations of inter-
state judgment recognition: the state of recognition is to apply the pre-
clusion law of the state of rendition when determining the preclusive
effect of a judgment rendered by that state. This reading of the full faith
and credit statute is not compelled by the history and usage of the statute
and the constitutional provision that it seeks to implement. In addition,
it fails to address and accommodate the federal and state interests inher-
ent in a question of interstate judgment recognition.6
To be fair, although the Supreme Court has often used its plain read-
ing approach to the full faith and credit statute in its pronouncements on
interstate preclusion,7 some of its decisions are difficult to reconcile with
the plain reading view.8 This suggests that the Court recognizes that, at
least in certain situations, the plain reading approach is not an appropri-
ate solution to the interstate judgment recognition problem. The pattern
of a predominant rule with a set of exceptions also suggests that a theory
can be developed that accounts for both the predominant pattern and the
exceptions in a unified way. Such a theory adds coherence to the law and
provides greater guidance for application of interstate preclusion doc-
trine to new situations. 9
This Article proposes a choice of law rule governing interstate preclu-
6. The thesis of this Article also has implications for the extent to which federal
courts are bound by former adjudications in state courts. The Article, however, will
concern itself primarily with interstate preclusion issues. For some thoughtful discus-
sions of the state-federal preclusion cases, see Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal
Litigation: Mapping the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 Ind. L.J. 59 (1982); Bur-
bank, Afterwards: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment on Marrese, 70 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 659, 662-65 (1985); Shreve, supra note 4; Smith, Full Faith and Credit and
Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63 N.C.L. Rev. 59 (1984).
7. See supra note 4.
8. See infra notes 160-260 and accompanying text.
9. As long as the rules of interstate preclusion take the form of a predominant rule
with certain exceptions, one never knows whether to simply apply the predominant rule
to a new situation or to fashion a new exception. Development of a theory underlying the
rules and the exceptions, however, removes this uncertainty.
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sion that attempts to further federal values in interstate judgment preclu-
sion while accommodating, to the extent possible, the interests of the
affected states. Part I of this Article discusses the values served by pre-
clusion law, in general, and preclusion by judgment, in particular,1" and
the additional values implicated when interstate judgment preclusion is
involved.11 Because of the importance of due process concerns in shap-
ing concepts of preclusion and choice of law, this Part also addresses the
relevance of the due process clause to the interstate judgment preclusion
problem. 2 Part II then evaluates the plain reading approach as a possi-
ble choice of law rule for the interstate judgment preclusion problem,
concluding that the plain reading approach is neither required by the full
faith and credit clause or statute,'I nor does it adequately serve the val-
ues implicated by the interstate judgment preclusion problem. 4 After
canvassing Supreme Court doctrine on interstate judgment preclusion in
Part III,15 the Article proposes in Part IV an alternative reading of the
full faith and credit statute that meshes with the outcomes of the decided
cases and that better accommodates the interests of the states, the federal
government and the policies of preclusion law than does the current
patchwork of a plain reading approach with limited exceptions.' 6 The
Article argues in Part IV that the state of recognition should apply the
preclusion law of the state of rendition only when the state of rendition
has an interest in having its preclusion law applied. In all other situa-
tions, the state of recognition is free to apply its own choice of law rule to
the preclusion law problem. This approach is then applied in a variety of
contexts. '
7
The approach suggested by this Article would not result in a radical
alteration in the outcome of most cases. Despite the lack of a unified
theory of interstate preclusion, the Supreme Court's approach produces
sensible results in most cases. There are some situations, however, in
which the plain reading approach makes little sense as a choice of law
rule. This Article's proposal would enable state courts to avoid some of
the needlessly harsh results that follow from the Court's plain reading
approach, while providing a unifying theory for the various exceptions
that currently litter the area of interstate judgment recognition. 8
10. See infra notes 19-57 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 71-91 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 92-140 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 144-260 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 261-266 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 267-286 and accompanying text.
18. As Professor Smith concluded:
The concept of full faith and credit that emerges from [a] review of Supreme
Court decisions is not unitary. It reflects different accommodations made by
the Court between full faith and credit and other state and federal interests.
The Court has not developed a consistent doctrine of exceptions, but has oper-
ated largely on an ad hoe basis because of the lack of textual support for excep-
1990]
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I. PRECLUSION LAW, CHOICE OF LAW, AND FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT
The full faith and credit to judgments problem involves an overlay of
choice of law and preclusion law issues. When a court is asked to recog-
nize a prior judgment, a set of preclusion law issues are raised. The court
must determine whether the prior judgment is of a sufficient quality to
give rise to preclusive effect, determine the content of the prior judgment,
and determine what preclusive effect, if any, the prior judgment should
have on the ongoing proceeding. Imbedded in the rules governing these
determinations are assessments of sometimes competing adjudicative val-
ues relating to the use of court resources, fairness to the litigants, and the
development of accurate legal and factual determinations.
When the court of rendition is different from the court of recognition,
an additional layer of issues is presented. The court of recognition must
make a choice of law determination with regard to which regime of pre-
clusion law it will apply in evaluating the prior judgment. This would be
a purely theoretical problem if preclusion law were uniform across court
systems.19 In fact, preclusion law is far from uniform. 0 Thus, the
choice of the preclusion law to be applied to a judgment can significantly
alter its preclusive effect.
This section sets forth a theoretical foundation for the consideration of
choice of law models for preclusion law problems. First, it discusses
principles and policies of preclusion law. The Article then considers the
relevant federal and state policies raised by the interstate preclusion
problem. Finally, this section discusses the applicability of the due pro-
cess clause as a constraint on choice of law in the interstate preclusion
area.
A. Preclusion Law Values
Preclusion by judgment is one of several devices that foreclose full con-
sideration of legal or factual issues.21 Although particular preclusion
rules vary across devices and across judicial systems, they are all conse-
tions to section 1738 and disagreement over the exceptions' scope and
justification.
Smith, supra note 6, at 82.
19. In some situations, however, the very fact that the judgment presented for recog-
nition is foreign can affect the court of recognition's posture towards the judgment. The
propriety of treating a foreign judgment differently than a domestic judgment is discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 267-273.
20. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 14.15, at 695 (1985).
21. Other preclusion devices include law of the case and stare decisis. See generally
A. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion V-3 to V-5 (1969), reprinted in Personal Injury An-
nual-1969 (L. Frumer & M. Friedman eds.) (discussing preclusion devices). Rules gov-
erning the scope of appellate review also operate to preclude appellate courts from fully
reviewing factual and legal determinations made by trial courts. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (forum non conveniens rulings by trial courts not
to be reversed on appeal unless they constitute abuse of trial court discretion); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52 (findings of fact not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous).
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quences of a judicial system's evaluation and weighing of adjudicative
and substantive values.
One factor driving preclusion doctrines is the perceived need for the
finality in judicial determinations. Courts, having decided an issue, do
not wish to reexamine it, absent compelling circumstances. 22 Such a re-
fusal conserves judicial resources, but at the potential expense of the ac-
curacy of the decision, fairness and parties' interests in having an
opportunity to be heard. Thus, the value of finality must be weighed
against these and other adjudicatory values.
Consider a factual determination-the cause of an airline accident.
Typically, a determination of the cause of the accident binds the same
parties in any subsequent actions.23 However, courts are divided as to
whether the determination is binding in subsequent actions involving dif-
ferent litigants.24 Courts adhering to the traditional rule, that parties
may be bound only by determinations in actions between the same par-
ties, are subordinating finality values to other adjudicatory values, such
as fairness and accuracy.25 Parties who were not involved in the prior
adjudication are not bound by it, even in those jurisdictions that have
abandoned the mutuality requirement, because of due process values.26
There are exceptions to preclusion, even for parties involved in the
original litigation. For example, a party might be able to obtain relief
from a judgment by establishing that the prior determination was ob-
tained through fraud, or if there is newly discovered evidence.27 In such
situations, the court subordinates its interest in finality to competing in-
22. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931)
("Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested
an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be
considered forever settled as between the parties.").
23. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982).
24. Numerous states and the federal courts have abandoned the requirement of mutu-
ality of parties as a condition for the operation of issue preclusion. See, e.g., Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-28 (1979); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust
& Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942). A number of states, however,
continue to adhere to the mutuality requirement. See, e.g., Goodson v. McDonough
Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 203-04, 443 N.E.2d 978, 987-88 (1983). See gener-
ally Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusion and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66
Cornell L. Rev. 510, 510 n.1 (1981) (documenting nine states that had recently reaffirmed
the mutuality requirement).
25. See generally C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, 18 Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 4464, at 583 (1981). The usual reason given for requiring mutuality of estoppel is that
it would be unfair to bind one party to the results of a prior adjudication without also
binding the other party to the current litigation to the results of the prior adjudication.
Due process prevents a party from being bound by the results of an adjudication in which
they did not have an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d
666, 671 (6th Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974).
26. See supra note 25.
27. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 526 (1931)
(collateral attack on jurisdiction allowed in the case of fraud); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b) (fraud or newly discovered evidence among grounds for relief from judgment).
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terests in fairness and in accuracy.28
Parties affected by litigation also have an interest in finality. A losing
party in a lawsuit is not likely to act in conformity with the judgment if it
is vulnerable to collateral attack. People must be able to act with some
assurance that what has been decided will remain decided. These expec-
tations in the state of the law are carried beyond the parties to a litigation
through the doctrine of stare decisis. Once a relevant court has decided a
legal issue, expectations are developed in reliance of that rule of law.
Again, of course, these interests in finality are counterbalanced by no-
tions of fairness and the drive to improve the accuracy of legal decisions.
Precedents can be reversed if they are plainly wrong; relief can be ob-
tained from a judgment when enforcing it would be unfair to the losing
party; nonparties are not bound by the results of prior adjudication be-
cause it is unfair to bind a party to a result without affording that party
an opportunity to be heard.
Some preclusion rules, most notably the doctrines of merger and bar,29
seek to ensure the efficient resolution of disputes by forcing the consider-
ation of related matters into a single case. Again, however, the doctrines
of merger and bar are tempered by other concerns. Forcing claims to be
litigated together interferes with the ability of parties to control their
lawsuits. For example, compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim rules
have the effect of forcing defendants to raise claims in forums and con-
texts that are not of their choosing. Courts have reached different ac-
commodations of these competing concerns.3° Similarly, because of
considerations of party autonomy in framing lawsuits, preclusion rules
are rarely interpreted as forcing the joinder of parties in lawsuits, particu-
larly when joinder is not possible in the forum selected.31
Although efficiency concerns are often consonant with finality con-
28. The doctrine of stare decisis displays this same tension. Stare decisis generally
favors finality in legal determinations, without regard to mutuality of parties, but does
permit courts to reexamine "binding precedent" in the interest of accuracy of decision.
See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 617-18 (1988) (per curiam). How-
ever, the presumption against overruling prior determinations is extremely strong. See,
e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370-71 (1989) (although prece-
dents are not "sacrosanct," party seeking to overrule point of statutory construction
bears heavy burden); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) ("any departure from
the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification").
29. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 18-20 (1982).
30. The Restatement, for example, links the necessity of bringing counterclaims, in
large part, to the joinder rules of the court. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22
(1982). Joinder rules vary widely as to which counterclaims, if any, are compulsory.
Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (counterclaim compulsory if it arises out of same transac-
tion and occurrence as an opposing party's claim) with Mich. Court Rule 2.203(B) (all
counterclaims permissive). Although the Federal Rules make certain counterclaims
compulsory, cross-claims are permissive. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
31. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 49 (1982) ("A judgment against
one person liable for a loss does not terminate a claim that the injured party may have
against another person who may be liable therefor."); cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 (requiring
court to determine whether there are non-prejudicial ways to adjudicate case before dis-
missing for failure to join indispensable party).
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cerns, as, for example, with notions of merger and bar, they are distinct
concerns that sometimes lead in different directions. For example, courts
often hold that an issue must actually be litigated and necessarily decided
in a prior litigation to have a preclusive effect in a subsequent litigation.32
This rule acknowledges that a litigant might choose to forego litigating a
particular issue, and should be able to do so without risking an adverse
determination in subsequent suits raising the same issue. This rule sacri-
fices finality for other values and appears to be inconsistent with the effi-
ciency rationale underlying merger and bar rules. One reason for the
rule3" is that it is not efficient for the judicial system to consider all the
possible issues raised by a case; if one issue is likely to be dispositive of a
case, no incentives should exist to force the consideration of other poten-
tial issues. Of course, a claim that could have been litigated, but was not,
can be precluded under the doctrines of merger or bar because in that
situation preclusion would foster finality and efficiency.
Similarly, the limitation of claim preclusion to claims arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence can be seen as marking the limits of judi-
cial efficiency. Finality is equally well served by extending claim preclu-
sion to all claims involving the same parties, but finality and efficiency
argue in favor of requiring that transactionally related claims be brought
together. When the two values coincide, other adjudicatory values, such
as party control of litigation, are outweighed.
Preclusion rules are also shaped by adjudicatory concerns that do not
relate directly to the goals of preclusion law. Particularly important are
the cluster of values that inform our understanding of due process.
34
Other adjudicatory values include a concern for accuracy in determina-
tions and a concern for the legitimacy of judicial institutions.35 For ex-
ample, preclusion will not apply to a determination that might be faulty
due to a change in law, newly discovered evidence, or proof of fraud in
the prior proceeding. 6 In all of these situations, allowing relitigation
would improve the accuracy of the determination of the issue at the ex-
pense of finality. Where allowing relitigation fosters accuracy and en-
hances the legitimacy of judicial institutions, without unduly interfering
with incentives to foster efficiency, the finality value will be trumped.
But where both finality and efficiency concerns will be adversely affected,
relitigation might not be allowed. Thus, the existence of newly discov-
32. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982); see, e.g., Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5
(1979).
33. One can posit reasons sounding in fairness, for example.
34. Due process and its relationship to intersystem preclusion is discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 61-77.
35. Professor Resnik has identified twelve adjudicatory values that help shape proce-
dural rules. See Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 837, 845-59 (1984). This discussion
focuses on some of the same values, although the author's conception of them may well
be different from that of Professor Resnik.
36. See supra note 27.
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ered evidence might be grounds for avoiding preclusion, whereas a fail-
ure to present evidence in an earlier proceeding would not be.
A concerrf for the integrity of the courts can also override the usual
preclusion concerns. For example, evidence of fraud in a prior proceed-
ing not only casts doubt on the accuracy of the issues decided in that
proceeding, but also attacks the very integrity of the court that was an
unwitting partner to the fraud. 7 Collateral attack is also often permitted
against jurisdictional defects in a prior proceeding in part because a juris-
dictional defect implicates the very power of the court to render a valid
judgment.
B. , Preclusion by Judgment
1. Types of Preclusion by Judgment
Preclusion by judgment includes the two doctrines of claim preclusion
(also known as res judicata) and issue preclusion (also known as collat-
eral estoppel), which form the bases for most uses of the full faith and
credit clause and statute as applied to judgments.38 Within both of these
doctrines, the goals of preclusion are tempered by other adjudicatory
values.
The doctrine of claim preclusion regulates the effect that a prior adju-
dication has on the ability of a party to that litigation to raise claims or
defenses that were raised, or could have been raised, in the prior adjudi-
cation.3 9 In general, a party is precluded from relitigating a claim or
defense that was raised in a prior proceeding between the same parties.
As a result, parties to the first action will pursue their claims with vigor
knowing that the results of the litigation will stand in the future. This
serves the ends of fairness, finality and efficiency. This is efficient because
37. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 70, at 180 (1982) ("[lIt is assumed that
modem systems of procedure generally yield results that are as just as may be expected.
Indeed, if this confidence did not exist, the concept of finality itself would be rationally
insupportable.").
38. Another potential application of full faith and credit to judgments is raised by the
credit to be given to the legal decisions rendered by courts on statutory, constitutional or
common-law issues. It is unclear, for example, whether such decisions are considered to
be judgments, entitled to recognition as such, or as part of the "law" of the state of the
rendering court. It appears that the "law" created by the judgment is recognized, at least
if the court is espousing views on the law of its own state. See Jackson, Full Faith and
Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1945). The
reasoning behind this determination, however, is largely a matter of faith and the deter-
mination creates some anomalies. For example, how ought a State X court regard a
decision by a State Y court on a matter of State X law? In terms of stare decisis, State X
may disregard the decision. Yet if the determination were one of State Y law, the State X
court would feel itself bound as if it were another State Y court.
This anomaly is further complicated by the notion that, even if the State X court is not
bound by the State Y court's determination of State X law in terms of stare decisis, it is
bound by the determination for purposes of claim and issue preclusion. See Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); see also infra notes 144-159 and accompanying text.
39. See generally Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 18-26 (1982) (discussing
claim preclusion); A. Vestal, supra note 21, at V-193 (same).
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matters will tend to be definitively resolved as early as possible. It pro-
vides certainty because all parties are bound by the results of the initial
determination. The application of claim preclusion is fair provided that
the court that adjudicated the dispute had jurisdiction over the dispute
and the parties and that each party had an adequate opportunity to be
heard.40
The doctrine of claim preclusion also provides that claims and de-
fenses which ought to have been raised in a prior adjudication between
the parties may not be raised in a subsequent adjudication between the
same parties. This doctrine reflects and is facilitated by parallel develop-
ments in the areas of pleading, joinder and, in the case of the federal
courts, pendant and ancillary jurisdiction."a It is fair only to the extent
that the parties are aware, in advance, of the consequences of failing to
raise a claim or defense.42
Because claim preclusion is tied to joinder rules, it reflects other con-
cerns as well, if only indirectly. For example, because rules governing
the compulsory nature of counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party
claims differ from each other and from the rules of joinder of claims by
the plaintiff,43 the preclusive effects of failure to raise a claim will also
differ. Thus, a defendant is generally less likely to be precluded from
bringing a claim in a subsequent action because of a failure to raise a
counterclaim because "the defendant.., should be allowed to bring suit
at a time and place of his own selection."'
The doctrine of issue preclusion provides that all issues of fact or law
litigated and determined by a final and valid judgment may not be reliti-
gated in subsequent actions between the same parties.45 Like claim pre-
clusion, the notion driving issue preclusion is that it is fair and efficient to
allow the parties only one opportunity to prove an issue of fact or law.
The doctrine is littered with exceptions, however, which help to lessen its
sting where competing values are implicated.46 For example, issue pre-
40. Due process requires an opportunity to be heard before a person's rights are de-
termined by a court. See Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449 (1982); Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S.
385, 394 (1914).
41. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 5-13 (1982). The Restatement has de-
fined the scope of an action for purposes of preclusion in a manner consistent with the
federal joinder rules and the scope of pendant and ancillary jurisdiction. Compare id.
§§ 22, 24 with Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966).
42. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 24, 26 (1982).
43. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims) with Fed. R. Civ. P.
13(b) (permissive counterclaims) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g) (permissive cross-claims) and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 (permissive third party claims) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 (permissive
joinder of claims) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 (necessary and indispensable joinder of parties)
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties).
44. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22 comment a (1982).
45. See id. § 27. See generally A. Vestal, supra note 21, at V-189 to V-393 (discussing
issue preclusion).
46. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982) (issue must actually be
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clusion preserves litigant control of litigation strategy. An issue that
could have been litigated but was not does not give rise to preclusive
effect.47 Similarly, even issues that were actually litigated, necessarily de-
cided and essential to the prior judgment will not give rise to issue pre-
clusion if the importance of the issue in the latter suit was not foreseeable
when the first action was litigated.4"
2. The Process of Preclusion by Judgment
The process of preclusion as a result of former adjudication entails
three analytically distinct steps. First, the court considering the preclu-
sion issue must decide whether to recognize the prior judgment-a deter-
mination of the quality of the judgment. Second, having decided that the
prior judgment is of a sufficient quality to be recognized, the court must
determine what that judgment decided-a determination of the content
of the judgment. Third, the court must determine the effect that the con-
tent of a valid prior judgment should have on the ongoing litigation.
It is important to consider each step in the preclusion process sepa-
rately because each serves different preclusion values and represents dif-
ferent tradeoffs between preclusion and other litigation values.49 For
example, suppose that a person is injured when her motorcycle is struck
by a milk delivery truck.5° She institutes an action against the driver of
the truck for damages to her motorcycle and collects $100. Thereafter,
she brings a separate action against the driver's employer for her per-
litigated and essential to the prior judgment); id. § 28 (listing five sets of exceptions to
general rule).
47. See id. § 27. This approach is vigorously criticized in Vestal, The Restatement
(Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 464, 473-74 (1981). But see
Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related
Problems, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 564, 577-79 (1981) (approving the approach of non-litigated
issues not giving rise to preclusion). It is difficult to explain the Restatement position on
the "actually litigated" requirement, given its acceptance of the idea that, in claim preclu-
sion, unraised claims and defenses arising out of the same series of transactions are pre-
cluded by judgment. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982). To the extent
these two positions are reconcilable, it is largely on grounds unrelated to preclusion
values.
48. See, e.g., Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1958) (Wisdom, J.)
(collateral estoppel applicable only where it was foreseeable fact would be of importance
in future litigation), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959); The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141
F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.) (fact of minor legal significance to the first action
might not be given preclusive effect in second action if that fact is of major legal signifi-
cance to second action), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944).
49. The chief counter-values are affording litigants an opportunity to be heard and
improving the accuracy of judicial determinations. Every time a court decides to pre-
clude litigation of an issue in an ongoing proceeding it is, implicitly or explicitly, making
a determination that the party to be bound by the prior adjudication need not have an
opportunity to litigate the issue and that accuracy gains, if any, to be derived from al-
lowing litigation are offset by other values. One casebook has made this point rather
dramatically by presenting preclusion doctrine in a chapter entitled "Anti-Procedure."
See R. Cover, 0. Fiss & J. Resnik, Procedure xv (1988).
50. The example is loosely based on Rush v. City of Maple Heights, 167 Ohio St. 221,
147 N.E.2d 599, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 814 (1958).
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sonal injuries. The second court is faced with issues of validity, content
and effect. First, it must determine whether the judgment is of a suffi-
cient quality to trigger preclusion. It might ask, for example, whether
the first proceeding was "final" or whether it was under appeal. 51 It
might examine whether the first court had jurisdiction over both the case
and the defendant.52 Only after the court is satisfied that the first judg-
ment is of a sufficient character and quality to be recognized does it go on
to determine the judgment's content and preclusive effect.53
Once the court has determined that the judgment is of sufficient qual-
ity to be recognized, it must determine what the prior proceeding actu-
ally decided. It might conclude, for example, that under the applicable
law drivers owe a duty of ordinary care to all persons and property lo-
cated within the zone of danger surrounding their vehicle and are liable
for all damages proximately caused by a breach of that duty. The court
might also conclude that the prior proceeding determined that the driver
of the speeding truck had failed to exercise ordinary care, that the motor-
cycle was within the zone of danger surrounding the truck, and that the
motorcycle was damaged in the amount of $100.
A court can also make a complementary determination of what was
not decided. In the example above, no determination was made concern-
ing the motorcycle operator's personal injuries, nor whether the em-
ployer would be liable for the $100 judgment against the employee, nor
whether the motorcyclist had been contributorily negligent.54
The court must then determine the preclusive effect to be given to that
judgment. In the example above, the court would likely address several
issues. First, should the plaintiff's failure to raise her personal injury
claim in the first proceeding preclude her from raising it in the latter
proceeding? Second, should the first court's determination that the milk
truck driver had been negligent preclude an independent determination
of the driver's negligence by the second court? Finally, should the differ-
51. See generally Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 (1982) (res judicata appli-
cable only where final judgment entered).
52. See generally id. §§ 4-12 (territorial and subject matter jurisdiction).
53. Most issues of judgment quality, such as consideration of whether the court of
rendition had jurisdiction over the parties, the subject matter of the action and that the
parties received notice of the action and an opportunity to be heard, reflect a primary
concern with due process. Other issues are also concerned with the accuracy of the prior
court's determinations. For example, nonfinal judgments might be deemed not to have
the requisite quality because they could be reversed at a later stage in the proceedings.
54. Of course, the determination of what was not decided should be bounded by what
could have been decided. If, for example, the claim for personal injuries could not have
been joined with the claim for property damage in the same suit, the fact that it was not
decided in the prior adjudication may not be relevant for preclusion purposes.
The determination of the content of a prior judgment is largely a technical exercise.
There are potentially troubling issues concerning the manner of proof. For example, it
must be established whether the content of the judgment is to be established by the judg-
ment or order itself, by the court's opinion, by the entire record or by testimony. Of the
three aspects of preclusion, the content of the prior judgment is the least problematic.
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ence in defendants in the two suits affect the preclusive effect of the first
suit?
However the court decides the first two questions of preclusive effect,
the prior judgment would be recognized; in one situation to benefit the
defendant, in the other to benefit the plaintiff. The problem is one of
effect rather than recognition. Similarly, although the court might de-
cide that, because of the different defendants in the two suits, the first
judgment should not have preclusive effect, it has still recognized the first
judgment; the court has determined that the first judgment is of sufficient
quality to give rise to preclusion and, but for the differences in parties in
the two actions, the content of the prior judgment would have given rise
to preclusive effects."
It is useful to think about preclusion in terms of these three steps, par-
ticularly in the interstate context, because the rules governing each step
can be animated by different concerns. For example, the quality of the
judgment is likely to be largely concerned with the integrity of the judi-
cial system that rendered the judgment and with fairness to the parties.
A default judgment rendered against a defendant over whom the court
lacked jurisdiction is not of a sufficient quality to be recognized because it
is not fair to the defendant to be bound by a judgment that was produced
without participation by the defendant and that lacks a justification for
the use of coercive force against the defendant. Such a judgment simi-
larly implicates the integrity of the court because the judgment lacks le-
gitimacy and justification. In the interstate context, because different
judicial systems render and assess the judgment, a uniform standard
might be desirable to prevent either judicial system from overreaching its
authority. Otherwise, a judicial system would be free to establish it own
standards of quality, which might not correspond to the standards of
other states. Because recognition of a prior judgment deprives a second
court of the power to relitigate a question, an overbroad standard of
quality would usurp the sovereign power of the court of recognition. The
content of the judgment, on the other hand, is largely descriptive and
rarely raises interstate recognition concerns.
The effect of the judgment raises concerns that might relate to either
the court of rendition or the court of recognition.56 For example, the
issue of mutuality of estoppel, which involves an assessment of preclusion
and adjudicative values by the court of recognition, is only peripherally
informed by the interests of the court of rendition.57
C. Full Faith and Credit Values
Preclusion by judgment assumes an additional layer of complexity in
55. There are many other potential issues of effect. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 28 (1982) (exceptions to preclusion noted in five specific circumstances).
56. In the ordinary preclusion issue, this inquiry is largely irrelevant because the
court of rendition is in the same judicial system as the court of recognition.
57. See infra notes 274-279 and accompanying text.
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the intersystem context. Although there is substantial agreement re-
garding the purposes of preclusion law, its specific application varies
across jurisdictions.5 s Intersystem preclusion rules must create a system
for determining the preclusive effect of a judgment that not only accom-
modates the diversity of preclusion rules, but which reflects values that
are peculiar to the intersystem context as well as the value choices impli-
cated by preclusion by judgment in general.
From a national perspective, the interstate preclusion problem can im-
plicate interests of the federal government. First, there are some substan-
tive concerns. Although the federal government was empowered to
regulate interstate and international commerce, foreign relations and
other powers,5 9 the states also play an important role in these areas;
many state court judgments implicate these substantive interests. For
example, consider a commercial transaction between citizens of different
states. Although the federal government has not found it necessary or
desirable to regulate these types of transactions directly, it may wish for a
predictable system for the regulation and enforcement of such transac-
tions because interstate commerce could be inhibited if state court judg-
ments concerning commercial transactions are arbitrarily denied
enforcement in other states.
This type of substantive interest is heightened when the underlying
cause of action is one of federal law. Because state courts exercise con-
current jurisdiction with the federal courts with respect to many federal
causes of action,"° it is likely that judgments rendered by a state court on
a federal cause of action will be presented for recognition in another
state's courts. The enforcement of a federal right would thus depend on
the posture of the state of recognition towards the prior judgment.
Beyond these substantive values, the full faith and credit clause ex-
presses a concern for unification across states in a federated system of
government, and in that sense, serves a federal interest.6 It provides that
state power, legislative or judicial, must be recognized in all other states.
This structure can produce conflicts between exercises of power by differ-
ent states. How these conflicts are resolved affects not only the states
themselves, but the nation and its citizens.
58. See Shreve, supra note 4, at 1216.
59. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
60. Unless a statute makes federal court jurisdiction exclusive of the state courts, see,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1334, 1338 (1982), federal courts exercise their jurisdiction con-
currently with the state courts. See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 20,
at 16.
61. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943):
The full faith and credit clause like the commerce clause thus became a nation-
ally unifying force. It altered the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created under
the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each
an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any




There is, however, a competing federalism concern raised by the full
faith and credit problem. Unification across states must occur at the ex-
pense of state prerogatives. A judgment by a state court not only deter-
mines the rights and obligations of the parties, but also often furthers the
policy objectives of the state. Indeed, this is the major justification for
the existence and power of courts.62 When a judgment rendered in one
state is used to preclude litigation in another state, the state of recogni-
tion is deprived of its opportunity to further its own policies. The failure
to recognize a sister state's judgment could frustrate the interests of the
state of rendition. The problem of full faith and credit is how to resolve
this conflict of state interests.63
The solution to the full faith and credit conflicts could be litigant-
based, state-based, or global solutions. A litigant-based solution would
look to what would be the "fairest" outcome for the litigants. The prob-
lem with this approach, however, is that it is indeterminate. Most con-
flicts in preclusion law would pit the interests of one litigant against the
interests of the other. Unless one has a higher-order rule, there is no way
to break the deadlock.6a
State-based solutions are also indeterminate. Consider two possible
rules: recognize all judgments according to the preclusion law of the
state of rendition or recognize all judgments according to the preclusion
law of the state of recognition. Looking only at full faith and credit val-
ues, as long as the state of recognition applies the preclusion rules of an
interested state, full faith and credit values are satisfied.65
A global solution would call for the development of national preclu-
sion law to be applied in all judgment recognition cases.66 Although it is
62. See id. at 441.
63. As Justice Frankfurter put it:
The... question before us is how far the Full Faith and Credit Clause under-
cuts the purpose of the Constitution, made explicit by the Tenth Amendment,
to leave the conduct of domestic affairs to the States. Few interests are of more
dominant local concern than matters governing the administration of law. This
vital interest of the States should not be sacrificed in the interest of a merely
literal reading of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 620 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
64. Such higher-order rules are possible, of course. For example, conflicts could be
resolved in favor of the rule giving rise to the most preclusion or the least preclusion. It is
not clear that there is a higher-order rule, however, that can be mined from an assessment
of full faith and credit values.
65. See Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments and Credit Due Laws: The Respective Roles
of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in the Interstate Context, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 95,
102 (1984). It should be noted that the choice need not be restricted to the preclusion
laws of the state of rendition and state of recognition, but might also include the preclu-
sion laws of the source of the substantive law under which the case had been decided. Cf
Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law:
A GeneralApproach, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 733, 830 (1986) (preclusive effect of judgments
generally determined by preclusion law of jurisdiction whose substantive law is being
applied).
66. It would also be possible to develop preclusion law that would only apply to inter-
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possible to define such national rules,6 7 their enforcement could be a for-
midable task. Even if they could be enforced, it is not clear that such
rules would be desirable. Preclusion rules reflect a balancing of the bene-
fits to be gained in permitting relitigation of the issue or claim against the
costs to the judicial system of allowing relitigation. A global solution
would make these decisions for all courts. Apart from the value of seeing
how different preclusion rules function empirically,6" the imposition of a
global solution encroaches on state prerogatives in a way that raises seri-
ous federalism concerns.6 9 Unless the imposition of uniform procedures
is required by due process principles, the federal government should be
reluctant to dictate the procedures state courts may use in adjudicating
cases.
Thus, the best solution to the problem appears to be the development
of second-order rules that select the preclusion law or constrain the
choice of preclusion law to be applied by the court of recognition. The
plain reading approach may be seen as such a rule-it directs that the
court of recognition always apply the law of the state of rendition. The
question is whether the plain reading approach is the second-order rule
that best furthers preclusion law and full faith and credit values.70
D. Due Process
The manner in which courts recognize prior judgments obviously af-
fects the interests of the parties. Thus, preclusion law in general and
interstate preclusion law in particular might implicate due process con-
cerns. However, unlike the typical choice of law problem, in which the
due process clause often functions in parallel with the full faith and credit
clause,7 the due process clause plays a limited and distinctive role in the
system cases. Such a solution would have all the problems of a global solution and so is
not considered separately.
67. A body of federal preclusion law exists as a result of federal common law. See,
e.g. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984); United States v. Mendoza,
464 U.S. 154 (1984); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Commis-
sioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924). See
generally Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 Yale L.J. 741 (1976) (historical survey of
development of preclusion law in federal courts).
68. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a... State may...
serve as a laboratory [for] novel social and economic experiments.").
69. This is not to suggest that such rules would be unconstitutional. Article IV would
appear to offer ample authority to act in this way. However, the spirit of the Constitution
should cause one to be hesitant to impose rules on the operation of state courts that
would apply to all cases, particularly if such rules might have fiscal ramifications.
70. This question is addressed infra at text accompanying notes 141-143.
71. In the typical choice of law context, a choice of the substantive law of a state that
lacks a significant relationship to the case would be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981); see also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930) (invali-
dating a choice of Texas law to construe Mexican insurance policy on due process




Both procedural and substantive due process intrude on the intersys-
tern preclusion problem. Under procedural due process, persons may not
be deprived of life, liberty or property in an adjudication without reason-
able notice of the action against them72 and an opportunity to be heard in
the proceeding.73 In addition, the proceeding must utilize appropriate
procedures.' It follows, then, that a court may not give preclusive effect
to a judgment that violates a party's due process rights.75 Due process
can act as a constraint on that judgment's preclusive effect, even if the
original judgment's validity may not be challenged. For example, the
test for determining whether to permit the use of nonmutual offensive
collateral estoppel includes an evaluation of the quality of the procedures
employed by the first court.76
The apparent power of the due process clause in preclusion situations
has been limited, however, by notions of waiver and opportunity to liti-
gate. Due process rights may be waived;7 7 parties who appear in an ac-
tion but fail to raise possible due process objections are deemed to have
waived their due process rights.78 As a result, a prior judgment that
might otherwise have been refused recognition on due process grounds
will be recognized if parties are found to have waived their rights. Simi-
larly, once a due process claim has been litigated, preclusive effect is
given to the issue decided. Thus, a determination in the first proceeding
that due process had been afforded a party must be accepted as true in
subsequent proceedings in which preclusive effect is sought, even if that
original determination is erroneous.79
This leaves a rather limited role for procedural due process in the pre-
clusion context. At present, the case law limits its application to two
supra note 65, at 108-10; see also Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61
Cornell L. Rev. 185, 185-201 (1976); Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit in Choice of Law, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 94, 150 (1976); Martin, A Reply to Professor
Kirgis, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 151, 151-55 (1976).
72. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
73. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
74. See id. at 90-93. Most of the case law on the adequacy of procedures has focussed
on non-judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323-26 (1976)
(Social Security Administration administrative review of disability benefit eligibility);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255-60 (1970) (New York City Department of Social
Services terminating public assistance without evidentiary hearing). Most judicial pro-
ceedings would conform to due process minima. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
discussed the possibility that a prior judgment need not be given preclusive effect because
of procedural due process defects. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331
(1979) (procedures employed by first forum a factor to be considered when determining
whether to give preclusive effect to issue determined by forum in offensive nonmutual
collateral estoppel situation).
75. See Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
76. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331.
77. See D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 183-88 (1972).
78. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 702-05 (1982); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
79. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931).
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situations: cases in which due process claims involving the first proceed-
ing cannot be said to have been litigated or waived, most notably attacks
at default judgments for lack of proper notice; 0 and situations in which
the quality of the procedures employed in the prior proceeding can be
considered as a discretionary factor in determining the preclusive effect
of that judgment."1
Substantive due process also plays a limited role in interstate preclu-
sion. The prototypical substantive due process claim in the preclusion
context is one that claims that the court acted without personal or sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, or that the court applied an improper choice of
substantive law. 2 Once again, although all of these issues can be raised
within the context of the original proceeding, litigation of these issues, or
even their appearance in the original action, precludes their considera-
tion in a subsequent suit. 3 Thus, it would appear that only default judg-
ments are vulnerable to attack on substantive due process grounds.8 4
A different type of due process claim is implicated in the preclusion
context. This claim treats the prior judgment as a property interest that
has vested in the judgment holder and imposes constraints and obliga-
tions on a court asked to recognize this property interest. The logic of
the claim is that once a final judgment has been rendered, failure to rec-
ognize the judgment amounts to a deprivation of a property interest
without due process of law.85
Analysis of this claim leads to two questions, depending on the con-
text. In the intrastate context, the relevant question is whether the court
has a rational basis for recognizing (or failing to recognize) the prior
judgment. So, for example, imposing a time limit for actions to enforce a
judgment has a rational basis, even though it might have the effect of not
giving preclusive effect to a prior judgment.
80. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 104 (1971).
81. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-33 (1979).
82. These are substantive due process claims in that the parties have been afforded
notice and an opportunity to be heard, but are contending that the court's actions, them-
selves, are unconstitutional.
83. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931) (per-
sonal jurisdiction); Des Moines Navigation & R.R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S.
552, 559 (1887) (subject matter jurisdiction).
84. But see Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-40 (1940) (collateral attack of final
state court judgment permitted in federal court because federal bankruptcy laws create an
exception to normal operation of full faith and credit statute). Kalb shows that, in appro-
priate situations, the usual laws of preclusion will give way to important substantive poli-
cies of the court of recognition.
85. This is, for the most part, a substantive due process claim. As long as the judg-
ment holder is afforded an opportunity to seek recognition of the judgment in a proceed-
ing with adequate procedures, a procedural due process claim would fail. The only
possible procedural due process objection is that a prevailing party should enjoy the right
to not have to relitigate a matter already litigated. Such a due process right to avoid
process is somewhat akin to the double jeopardy clause, U.S. Const. amend. V, which has
been limited by the Supreme Court to a narrow range within the criminal law context.




In the interstate context, in addition to justifying preclusion itself, the
court must justify its choice of preclusion rule. Under due process analy-
sis, however, the choice of preclusion law is easily justifiable, as long as
the law chosen bears some relation to the controversy.8 6 Either the pre-
clusion law of the state rendering the first judgment or the preclasion law
of the forum would appear to satisfy this test.87 So, if a state applied its
own statute of limitations to an action to enforce a judgment, or if it
applied the statute of limitations of the state that rendered the judgment,
no due process right in the prior judgment would be upset.
Thus, although a judgment holder would appear to have a vested right
in the judgment, that right is not as powerful as it might first appear.
The right that vests is only to require the court of recognition to treat the
prior judgment in a rational manner. The limited nature of this right can
be shown by returning to the accident example mentioned earlier; 8 a
person involved in an accident institutes one action in negligence for
damage to her motorcycle and another for her personal injuries. The
property action reaches judgment first and the plaintiff is awarded dam-
ages. In the personal injury action, both parties seek to exercise the
"right" that has vested in the property action. The plaintiff asserts that,
because the issue of the defendant's negligence has been decided in the
earlier suit, the defendant is precluded from relitigating the issue in the
personal injury suit. The defendant asserts that, because the personal
injuries arose from the same event as did the property damage, the per-
sonal injury claim has merged into the prior judgment and, because the
plaintiff did not raise the claim in the prior suit, she is precluded from
litigating the claim in the second suit.
However a particular jurisdiction resolves the competing preclusion
claims, it is clear that it does so not under a theory of vested rights, but
based on its evaluation of preclusion law principles. As a result, it is false
to say that judgments create rights that vest in favor of litigants. Rather,
courts recognize judgments to serve judicial goals that often, but not in-
variably, correspond to the interests of the "rights" holder.
A more sophisticated variant of the vested rights claim is that the
rights vested in a judgment include the use of preclusion law of the court
86. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806-07 (1985); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1935).
87. If preclusion law is deemed to be part of the "procedural" law of the forum, see
Restatement (Second) of Judgments 5-13 (1982), the forum may employ its own preclu-
sion law, at least with regard to the due process clause, in matters of recognizing judg-
ments. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (state may apply its
own statute of limitations to action even if it applies the substantive law of another state
because the statute of limitations is procedural); McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
312 (1839) (forum may apply its own statute of limitations governing enforcement of a
judgment). Even if preclusion law is considered "substantive," the forum would proba-
bly have a sufficient interest in the action to justify, at least in due process terms, the
application of its own preclusion law.
88. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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that rendered the judgment. This view fails to comport with preclusion
law practice and is analytically indefensible. If the claim were true, sev-
eral aspects of interstate preclusion doctrine, such as the workers' com-
pensation cases,89 recognition of equity decrees9° and recognition in
domestic relations cases, 91 would be constitutionally defective. In all of
these situations, the court asked to recognize the prior judgment does so
using its own preclusion law.
Analytically, it is difficult to see why the procedural law of the court of
rendition should be applied in future litigation in some other forum. The
forum's procedural law is in no way tied to the substantive right sought
to be adjudicated, but is only applied by the forum because the forum
deems those procedures to be proper and fair. If the forum in which
recognition is sought has different rules which it deems to be proper and
fair, why shouldn't it be able to apply them, as long as the rules satisfy
due process? Once again, the claim assumes what it has to prove-that a
"right" to a particular regime of preclusion law exists and that a state
cannot apply a different one without violating the due process clause.
E. Summary
Because intersystem preclusion involves two issues-the application of
rules of preclusion to a prior judgment and the choice of preclusion
law-subject to due process constraints, intersystem preclusion is an in-
tricate and somewhat convoluted area of law. Having identified the vari-
ous concerns at stake, the Article turns to a consideration of the plain
reading approach in light of these concerns.
II. THE PLAIN READING APPROACH TO INTERSYSTEM PRECLUSION
The preceding section of the Article has shown that a consideration of
preclusion and full faith and credit values does not unambiguously indi-
cate whether a particular state's preclusion law should be used. None-
theless, it is clear that some choice of law rules are needed to foster
uniformity and to allocate the power of adjudication among the states
sensibly.
In assessing the plain reading rule as a choice of law rule, this section
first confronts the argument that application of the plain reading rule is
required by either the full faith and credit clause or the full faith and
credit statute. If either of these claims were true, courts would be bound
to apply the plain reading rule even if other choice of law rules addressed
full faith and credit and preclusion law values more coherently. 92 The
Article next considers the merits of the plain reading approach as a co-
89. See infra notes 179-213 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 214-230 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 255-260 and accompanying text.
92. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 comment a (1971) ("A court,
subject to constitutional limitations, must follow the directions of its legislature.").
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herent way to address and accommodate full faith and credit and preclu-
sion law values.
A. Interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Statute
The plain reading approach is, in choice of law terms, a rule that re-
quires the court of recognition to apply the preclusion law of the state in
which judgment was rendered. It is called the plain reading approach
because it is alleged to be compelled by the plain language of the full faith
and credit clause and statute.93 This approach to the statute would be
defensible, even if it sometimes produces less than optimal results, if it
could be shown that it was dictated either by the full faith and credit
clause, the framers' understanding of the clause, or the legislative history
of the full faith and credit statute.94 An examination of these materials
suggests that, to the extent the framers had an understanding of what the
full faith and credit clause and statute were trying to accomplish, the
purpose of the provisions was considerably less ambitious than the plain
reading approach, as applied, suggests. Indeed, as other commentators
have concluded, "history provides no aid to interpretation except per-
haps to make clear that the words of the implementing statute should not
be given their literal effect." 95
93. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 (1982) ("By its
terms, therefore, [section] 1738 would appear to preclude... relitigating the same ques-
tion in federal court" that had already been decided in state court); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (full faith and credit statute "specifically require[s] all federal
courts to give preclusive effect to state court judgments whenever the courts of the State
from which the judgments emerged would do so").
94. The process of statutory and constitutional interpretation is itself a matter of con-
troversy. Some advocate adherence to only the plain meaning of texts and would not
examine other possible sources of meaning. This view has assumed new prominence in
the opinions of Justice Scalia. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 109 S. Ct.
1981, 1994 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I would not permit any of the historical and
legislative material ... to lead me to a result different from [the plain reading]"). This
Article will not attempt to address this claim fully except to note that Justice Scalia, in
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), did not use the plain reading approach in
interpreting the full faith and credit clause. In Sun Oil, Justice Scalia interprets the
clause by referring to existing international law at the time of its adoption, comments of
the framers and the history of practice in the area. See id. at 722-26. Interestingly, Jus-
tice Scalia makes no mention of the full faith and credit statute and its possible import in
the question of whether a state court is required to apply the statute of limitations of the
state whose law creates the cause of action.
Chief Judge Wald has expressed views on statutory interpretation that both describe
the process of interpretation and prescribe the proper method:
No occasion for statutory construction now exists when the Court will not look
at the legislative history. When the plain reading rhetoric is invoked, it be-
comes a device not for ignoring legislative history but for shifting onto legisla-
tive history the burden of proving that the words do not mean what they appear
to say.
Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 195 (1982) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
95. Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum. L.
Rev. 153, 155 (1949).
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1. The Framers' Intent
Surprisingly little is known of the framers' intentions in adopting the
full faith and credit clause.96 What little evidence there is tends to sup-
port the view that the clause was intended to be a rule of evidence, re-
quiring sister states to give full evidentiary value to proof proffered of the
laws and judgments of other states.97 An evidentiary approach would
presumably leave most of the choice of law issues to the court of recogni-
tion. For example, issues of judgment quality, including the existence of
jurisdiction in the rendering court, would be determined by the court of
recognition. Similarly, certain issues of effect, such as mutuality and
privity of parties, would be decided by preclusion law principles of the
court of recognition. Of course, even the evidentiary approach would
have a substantial effect on the court of recognition's assessment of the
content of the prior judgment and on preclusive effect, to the extent that
the judgment is recognized at all. This would be true even when the
prior judgment entailed matters of concern to the court of recognition.9"
Recognition of foreign judgments had been a problematic area in both
British99 and colonial courts. Several colonies entered into treaties pro-
viding for mutual recognition of judgments and others enacted statutes
providing for the recognition of colonial judgments." ° It is not surpris-
96. The major scholarly accounts of the framing of the full faith and credit clause
include Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 Yale
L.J. 421 (1919); Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev 371
(1933); Costigan, The History of the Adoption of Section I of Article IV of the United
States Constitution and a Consideration of the Effect on Judgments of that Section and of
Federal Legislation, 4 Colum. L. Rev. 470 (1904); Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to
Judgments and Public Acts: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 33
(1957); Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 39 Ill. L.
Rev. 1 (1944); Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal System, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 140
(1936); Sumner, The Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause-Its History and Purpose, 34 Or. L.
Rev. 224 (1955); Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full
Faith and Credit, 12 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1 (1981). A particularly important account,
because of its author, is contained in Jackson, supra note 29.
97. See Whitten, supra note 96, at 31-39. Whitten reaches his conclusion, however,
largely from an assumption that "full faith and credit," as used in the Constitution,
would take on the same meaning as it had in the Articles of Confederation and in English
and Colonial practice. See id. at 31. Looking only at the sparse record of proceeding of
the framers, it is difficult to reach any definitive conclusion. Interestingly, Madison, in
The Federalist No. 42, viewed the constitutional language as "extremely indeterminate,"
although he believed the clause to be "an evident and valuable improvement on the clause
relating to this subject in the articles of Confederation" because of the power granted to
Congress to specify the manner of proof and the effect of prior judgments. See The Fed-
eralist, No. 42, at 308 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
98. For example, if a state court had construed a contract between citizens of different
states according to forum law, the court of recognition could not reinterpret the contract
under its own laws. Assuming that the prior judgment was of a sufficient quality to be
recognized and that it should have an effect on the parties, the court of rendition's factual
findings and interpretation of the contract would become conclusive evidence bearing on
the meaning and validity of the contract.
99. The English practice of the time is discussed in Whitten, supra note 96, at 12-19.
100. See id. at 19-24. Most of the colonies dealt with the problem using evidentiary
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ing that the Articles of Confederation contained a full faith and credit
provision. 10'
Little is known of the intent of the drafters of the Articles.1o2 Appar-
ently, although the language adopted met with little resistance,' 013 a mo-
tion to create an action of debt enforceable in all states based on the
existence of a judgment from any state was defeated." 4 Commentators
disagree on the importance of the motion's defeat. 05 Moreover, the five
reported cases construing the full faith and credit provision of the Arti-
cles of Confederation also do not provide much guidance in determining
the meaning of the clause.' 06
The actions of the framers of the Constitution should be seen against
this background. The limited references to discussions by the framers
concerning the full faith and credit clause tend to confirm that the clause
was not intended to break new ground.0 7 The mere existence of the
clause, however, has caused some to view it as intending to place sister
state judgments on a higher plane than other foreign judgments. 0 8 This
theory assumes that, in the absence of any clause, sister state judgments
would be recognized at least to the same extent as judgments of foreign
nations. 10 9 Thus, there would have been no reason to enact a full faith
and credit clause unless it was intended to go beyond principles of inter-
national law.' 10
concepts. Massachusetts did go further, however, in that it gave colonial judgments the
same effect on the merits that a Massachusetts judgment would have had. See id. at 24.
101. "Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts and
judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State." Articles of Con-
federation art. IV.
102. See Nadelmann, supra note 96, at 35; Whitten, supra note 96, at 24-27.
103. See Sumner, supra note 96, at 229-30.
104. See Nadelmann, supra note 96, at 36.
105. Professor Radin attributes its defeat to technical aspects of the provision dealing
with bonding requirements. See Radin, supra note 96, at 6. Professor Whitten argues
that the defeat of the motion lends additional support for his view that full faith and
credit was intended to be an evidentiary concept. See Whitten, supra note 96, at 28.
106. The cases are: Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby 119 (Conn. 1786); Phelps v. Holker, 1 Dall.
261 (Pa. 1788); Miller v. Hall, 1 Dall. 229 (Pa. 1788); James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188 (Pa.
1786); Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S.C.L. 3, 1 Bay 8 (1784). Compare Sumner, supra note 96, at
230 ("In each of these cases it was held that the clause was nothing more than a rule of
evidence.") and Whitten, supra note 96, at 29 ("none of the cases are inconsistent with
[the evidentiary] interpretation") with Nadelmann, supra note 96, at 53 ("These few deci-
sions are insufficient to support any specific construction of the Full Faith and Credit
clause in the Articles.").
107. See Radin, supra note 96, at 7; Reese & Johnson, supra note 95, at 154-55; Sum-
ner, supra note 96, at 235.
108. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 6, at 66 ("it is apparent that the clause was included
in the Constitution to further the sense of federation among the states").
109. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). In fact, there would be little
difference in result if sister states would recognize each other's judgments as a matter of
comity. See infra note 110. There could, however, be a lack of uniformity in approach to
judgment recognition and more potential for abuse. See infra note 111.
110. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98 comment b (1971) states:
"Judgments rendered in a foreign nation are not entitled to the protection of full faith and
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This is a powerful argument, but one that assumes too much about the
aims of the framers. The Constitution was not entirely a document of
revision, setting forth changes from the existing legal framework; instead,
it was in large part a constructive document, setting forth a new struc-
ture of government. It was logical, especially considering the existence of
similar provisions in the Articles of Confederation,111 that provisions for
judgment recognition were spelled out in the Constitution. Similarly, it
is widely believed that other provisions of the Constitution were added
for clarity, not to alter the law. 12
Given the paucity of evidence of intent and the opaqueness of the text,
it is not surprising that most adherents of the plain reading approach rely
on the full faith and credit statute for support. 1 13
2. The Full Faith and Credit Statute
One notable change from the Articles of Confederation language is the
provision in the Constitution empowering Congress to develop statutes to
specify the manner in which judgments and laws are to be proved and the
credit. In most respects, however, such judgments... will be accorded the same degree
of recognition to which sister State judgments are entitled."
11. Indeed, one can imagine the argument that, if the full faith and credit clause had
not been included in the Constitution, the omission would be seen as a rejection of the
obligation to recognize sister state judgments.
Another possible justification for the clause is that it provided for federal supervision.
This justification is obviously implicated by the provision empowering Congress to de-
velop standards encompassing the manner of proof and effect of sister state judgments.
But even if Congress had failed to so act, the clause would give rise to subject matter
jurisdiction in at least the Supreme Court in cases presenting interstate preclusion law
issues. Thus, even if no change from international law was intended, the clause was es-
sential in order to give the federal courts the power to police the actions of the states
under the standards of international law. In the absence of a full faith and credit clause,
the failure of one state to recognize the judgment of another state would appear to raise
no federal question.
112. The Bill of Rights is a good example. Some opposed adoption of such provisions
because they might be construed to limit the enforcement and recognition of individual
rights. See 2 J. Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution 436 (2d ed. 1836) ("an imperfect enumeration would throw all
implied power into the scale of the government, and the rights of the people would be
rendered incomplete.") (remarks of James Wilson); The Federalist No. 84 at 535 (A.
Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (The Bill of Rights "would contain various exceptions to
powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim
more than were granted."). See generally, Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 69 Va. L. Rev. 223, 238-59 (1983) (discussing debates over ratification of
Bill of Rights and ninth amendment). As the ninth amendment makes clear, however,
the Bill of Rights was intended as a partial enumeration of particular rights. See I An-
nals of Cong. 456 (1789) (statement of James Madison) (defending Bill of Rights against
this objection by pointing to existence of what is now ninth amendment). Whether or not
it is prudent for judges to enforce rights not specifically enumerated in the constitution
against state or federal action, it seems clear as an analytical matter that the ninth amend-
ment must be read as envisioning the existence of rights not specifically enumerated in the
constitution.




effect of such judgments and laws in the state of recognition. Pursuant to
this power, the first Congress passed the full faith and credit statute.1 1 4
In its initial formulation, the statute provided, in pertinent part, that
"records and judicial proceedings, [properly] authenticated, shall have
such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United
States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which
they are or shall be taken.""' 5 Early courts construed the statute as being
concerned only with evidence, and not as a directive to apply the preclu-
sion law of the state of rendition in determining the effect of the prior
judgment.' 6 In Mills v. Duryee,'" however, the Supreme Court rejected
the evidentiary interpretation of the full faith and credit statute."I8 In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Story reached his conclusion by taking a
plain reading of the statute and contending that the evidentiary approach
would render the full faith and credit clause illusory, as evidentiary rec-
ognition would have been accorded foreign judgments under the com-
mon law." 9 Story did not consider any of the policies underlying full
faith and credit nor did he consider legislative intent. 120
Story's interpretation of the full faith and credit statute is a plausible
interpretation and, but for subsequent doctrinal developments, might be
entirely defensible. Adherents of the plain reading approach must con-
front two inconsistencies with the approach: first, the inconsistency in
treatment between faith and credit to judgments and faith and credit to
laws; and second, the fact that the plain reading approach is not followed
by the Supreme Court in particular situations. Because these inconsis-
tencies cannot be explained by reference to a plain reading of the full
faith and credit statute, adherents of the plain reading approach are
114. 1 Stat. 122 (1790).
115. Id.
116. See Peck v. Williamson, 19 F. Cas. 85 (No. 10,896) (C.C.D.N.C. 1813) (Marshall,
C.J.). See generally Whitten, supra note 96, at 41-49. There were also cases running to
the contrary. See generally id.
117. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
118. See id. at 484-85. The case is also notable because Francis Scott Key argued the
case before the Supreme Court, representing the defendant.
119. See id. at 483-84. Over time, the distinction between a recognition requirement
emanating from the full faith and credit statute and one deriving from the Constitution
became garbled to the point that it appeared that the full faith and credit statute, if not
the constitutional clause itself, required a court to recognize prior judgments in accord-
ance with the preclusion law of the state of recognition. See Whitten, supra note 96, at 51
n.257 (citing 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United Stated § 1309
(5th ed. 1891)). It is clear, however, that Story relied on the full faith and credit statute
to reach the result in Mills.
120. See also Jackson, supra note 38, at 7 ("Mr. Justice Story gave no exposition of the
philosophy of the clause.")
It is not crucial to this analysis that the framers or the drafters in fact intended the
clause or the statute to represent only evidentiary concepts because the Article's analysis
is largely focused on policy considerations. If the support is inconclusive for the view
that the statute or clause envisioned an incorporation of the preclusion law of the render-
ing state, such an interpretation might still be defended, but the justification must be
based on policy considerations.
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forced to defend their views on policy grounds. When viewed on policy
grounds, however, the plain reading approach is an unattractive solution
to interstate preclusion problems.
3. Consistency in Treatment Between Full Faith and Credit to Laws
and to Judgments
Although there are parallel references to laws and judgments of sister
states in the constitutional provisions,12 full faith and credit to laws was
not thought to be enforceable throughout much of our constitutional his-
tory. 122 Much of the choice of law problem was thought to be a matter
of "general common law" under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 123 and
was not conceived of as a full faith and credit matter. 124 Indeed, some
scholars thought that the full faith and credit clause was not self-execut-
ing; unless Congress executed its power to determine the effect of the
laws of sister states, the full faith and credit clause imposed no restraints
on the actions of states. 25 This view was shattered in the 1930s when the
121. There was no clause dealing with the faith and credit to be given to laws in the
Articles of Confederation.
122. As Professor Brilmayer has stated, "The parallel treatment of judgments and leg-
islative acts is evident. Yet virtually the entire effect of the clause and its implementing
statute has occurred in the context of interstate enforcement of judicial decisions. The
impact on the disregard of other states' laws has been minimal." Brilmayer, supra note
65, at 95.
123. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Swift was, of course, subsequently overruled in Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
124. The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson provided that courts were free to decide questions
of "general law" through the use of universal principles of law and were not bound to
follow the common-law precedents of any particular jurisdiction. In Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Justice Brandeis criticized Swift as resting on the un-
founded assumption that there was " 'a transcendental body of law outside of any partic-
ular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.'" Id. at 79
(quoting Justice Holmes).
The Swift doctrine had two effects on the choice of law problem. First, choice of law
was largely irrelevant in the context of common-law actions because the court deciding
the question was not limited to the precedents of any one jurisdiction. For example, the
lower courts in the Erie case did not determine the railroad's duty of care to Tompkins by
reference to the tort law of any particular jurisdiction, but decided the issue on the basis
of "general law." See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-80.
Second, in those situations in which choice of law analysis was performed, choice of
law was itself considered to be a common-law area, subject to the Swift general common-
law principles. See, e.g., Stewart v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 168 U.S. 445, 450 (1897) (choice
of law determination of applicability of wrongful death statute); Northern Pac. R.R. v.
Babcock, 154 U.S. 190, 196-99 (1894) (choice of law determination of wrongful death
recovery limits); Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11, 21 (1880) (choice of law determi-
nation on scope of wrongful death statute).
125. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 96, at 73 ("For about a century after the making
of the Constitution, the general view was that, for 'public acts,' the command in the Full
Faith and Credit clause was not self-executing."); Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit
Required for Public Acts, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 383, 387-388 (1929) (same). Although the full
faith and credit clause had little effect on choice of law during this period, the due process
clause was available to correct at least some choice of law decisions. See, e.g., Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1930) (choice of Texas law to interpret contract be-
tween Mexican citizens entered into in Mexico and to be performed in Mexico violates
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Supreme Court began to use the full faith and credit clause, or at least
consider its possible use, to invalidate choice of law decisions made by
states that might have paid short shrift to the laws of sister states. 126
The doctrine developed by these cases stood in sharp contrast to then-
prevailing choice of law doctrine, which emphasized bright-line rules for
selecting the applicable law.127 Rather than using the clause to impose a
view as to the proper choice of law methodology, the Court viewed full
faith and credit as setting an outer boundary that constrained a state's
choice of law. A state thus gave full faith and credit to the laws of sister
states, even when it declined to enforce the sister state's law, as long as it
applied the law of an interested state, most often the law of the forum.128
Before 1948, a rational argument could be made to justify this differ-
ence in approach between faith and credit to laws and faith and credit to
judgments, based on the fact that the full faith and credit statute covered
only judgments. Under this argument, the Constitution only required
sister states to take due regard of sister states' laws and judgments, but
did not require deferral to foreign laws and judgments in cases where the
sister state's law or judgment arguably should apply. 2 9 The full faith
and credit statute, however, went beyond this constitutional minimum to
require deference to the interest of the state of rendition. 3 ' Because the
statute only encompassed faith and credit to judgments, the lack of paral-
lel treatment was rational.
This argument became harder to make, however, following the 1948
the due process clause). The full faith and credit clause was used to invalidate a choice of
law in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). It has thus been clear
since at least 1932 that the full faith and credit clause imposed some restrictions on a
forum's choice of law decision. Under the current standard, a state may choose the law
of any state that has "'a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creat-
ing state interests, such that [the] choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair.'" Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981)). Many scholars believe, however, that the
Court has not gone far enough in regulating choice of law. See R. Cramton, D. Currie &
H. Kay, Conflict of Laws 415 (4th ed. 1987) ("conflicts scholars have made a cottage
industry of criticizing the plurality opinion in Hague").
126. See, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493, 502-03 (1939) (full faith and credit clause does not preclude state from applying its
workers' compensation statute when the worker was injured in the state); Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 544-50 (1935) (full faith and credit
clause does preclude state from applying its workers' compensation statute when the em-
ployment relationship was formed in the state); Bradford Elec. Light, 286 U.S. at 154-55
(full faith and credit clause requires application of the workers' compensation statute of
the state in which the employment relationship was formed).
127. This approach, sometimes termed a "vested rights" approach, is reflected in the
approaches taken in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) by its reporter, Joseph
Beale.
128. See supra note 125.
129. See Nadlemann, supra note 96, at 79-81.
130. Cf Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 273 n.18 (1980) ("Con-
gress clearly has the power to increase the measure of faith and credit that a State must
accord to the laws or judgments of another State .... ).
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amendment to the full faith and credit statute. 131 The 1948 version of
the statute carries forward the parallel treatment of laws and judgments
contained in the full faith and credit clause and appears to require the
court of recognition to defer in both situations. Thus, adherents of the
plain reading approach must justify why the same language in the clause
and the statute has different meanings depending on whether recognition
is sought of another state's law or another state's judgment.
The response to the 1948 changes has taken three forms. One ap-
proach, often followed by the Supreme Court, is not to acknowledge the
changes at all. The post-1948 cases involving full faith and credit chal-
lenges to choice of law decisions have, for the most part, continued to
rely on pre-1948 opinions construing the full faith and credit clause, with
nary a mention of the full faith and credit statute.132
The second approach is to rely on the fact that the legislative history of
the 1948 amendments appears to view the changes to the full faith and
credit statute as being "technical" or "grammatical," and gives no hint
that any change in substance was intended.1 33 Under this view, the
131. The present version of the statute is unchanged from the 1948 version.
132. See, eg., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-23 (1985) (voiding
choice of law determination on full faith and credit clause grounds); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 306-13 (1981) (upholding choice of law determination against full
faith and credit clause challenge); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181 (1964)
(same); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954) (same).
In Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955), an employee residing in Missouri was injured
in Arkansas while in the course of employment for a Missouri employer. The Missouri
Compensation Act specified that unless the employer or the employee filed a written
waiver prior to the occurrence of an accident, the parties would be "'conclusively pre-
sumed to have elected to accept' its provisions," that provides that the Act constitutes the
exclusive remedy for injuries. See id. at 409 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.060 (1949)).
The Act applied to injuries received outside the state if the employment contract was
made, as it was in Carroll, in Missouri. See id. Even though no written waiver was filed
prior to the accident and even though Carroll was receiving weekly payments under the
Missouri Act, Carroll sued Lanza in an Arkansas court for common-law damages. See
id. at 410. The majority opinion, in sustaining a judgment in favor of Carroll based on
Arkansas law, followed the general pattern of disregarding the full faith and credit stat-
ute, despite Justice Frankfurter's invocation of the statute in his dissent:
Furthermore, the new provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 cannot be disregarded. In
1948 Congress for the first time dealt with the full faith and credit effect to be
given statutes. The absence of such a provision was used by Mr. Justice Stone
to buttress the Court's opinions both in Alaska Packers, 294 U.S., at 547, and
Pacific Employers, 306 U.S., at 502. Hence, if § 1738 has any effect, it would
seem to tend toward respecting Missouri's legislation.
Id. at 422 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
In Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), the Court recognized the 1948 revision to 28
U.S.C. § 1738 but "found it unnecessary to rely on any changes accomplished by the
Judicial Code revision." Id. at 613 n.16. The apparent pattern of disregarding the full
faith and credit statute has prompted the following questions in a prominent casebook on
the conflict of laws: "Is it surprising that this statute has not figured prominently in the
[Court's] decisions? Does it mean anything at all?" R. Cramton, D. Currie & H. Kay,
supra note 125, at 410.
133. The revisers' notes suggests that the words "such acts" were included in the re-
vised statute in order to "follow[ ] the language of Article IV, section 1 of the Constitu-
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changes in the statute were "inadvertent" and should be ignored.' 34
Although there is precedent for ignoring the plain language of statutes,
ordinarily the reason for it is not that the language was not intended, but
because the court believes that the language is so irrational that it is nec-
essary to look to alternative indications of legislative intent.135 In any
event, it is difficult to reconcile a policy-oriented reading of the statute in
the choice of law area with a plain language approach in the judgment
recognition area.
The third justification for ignoring the statute specifically considers the
policies underlying full faith and credit. Proponents of this view argue
that deferring to the law of a sister state is irrational and perverse.13 6 It
is irrational because it does not sensibly address the policies of full faith
and credit. 37 It is perverse because, in the identical case brought in two
different state courts, each court might be forced to apply the law of the
tion" and that it was a mere change in "phraseology." Legislative History of Title 28,
United States Code "Judiciary and Judicial Procedure" A150 (R. Merskey & J. Jacob-
stein eds. 1971). Commentators have had harsh words for the revised statute. Professor
Wright states that "The Judicial Code of 1948 is not a distinguished document." Id. at
III. Brainerd Currie found that the full faith and credit statute as revised was "simply
unintelligible." Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, reprinted in B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws
188, 200 (1963). Professor Whitten has written that "[t]he revisers obviously did not
have any idea what they were doing." Whitten, supra note 96, at 61.
134. Cf Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2009 (1989) ("Concerning the 1948
recodification of the Judicial Code.. .[,] 'no changes in law or policy are to be presumed
from changes of language in the revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly
expressed.'" (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227
(1957))).
135. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940):
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute
than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its
wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the
purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning.
When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has
looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even
when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreason-
able one "plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole" this
Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there
certainly can be no "rule of law" which forbids its use, however clear the words
may be on "superficial examination."
Id. at 543-44 (footnotes omitted)
136. See Nadlemann, supra note 96, at 75-76; Sterk, Full Faith and Credit, More or
Less, to Judgments: Doubts About Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 69 Geo. L.J.
1329, 1340 (1981).
137. As Justice Stone wrote in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939):
[Tihe very nature of the federal union of states, to which are reserved some of
the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause
as the means for compelling a state to substitute the statutes of other states for
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other state. 31
An implication of this third approach to the interpretation of the full
faith and credit statute is that it is sensible to take a plain reading of the
full faith and credit statute in the judgments context. 139 In order to ex-
plore this assumption, we must identify the values of full faith and credit
and determine how well these values are served by a plain reading of the
full faith and credit statute."
B. The Plain Reading Approach, Preclusion Values and Full Faith
and Credit Values
From a policy perspective, the plain reading rule might best be seen as
a rule that is easy to identify and apply and one which often produces
sensible results. The doctrine promotes consistent results across cases
and across states. However, it does not always sensibly divide power
between the state of rendition and the state of recognition, nor does it
always produce results that best advance preclusion law values.
Whenever adhering to the preclusion law of the state of rendition
would encourage litigants to raise claims and issues in a way that encour-
ages efficiency and finality, the plain reading rule facilitates preclusion
law values. In addition, if adhering to the preclusion law of the state of
rendition furthers that state's substantive interests, the plain reading ap-
proach represents a sensible accommodation of competing state interests.
Many, if not most, situations fall under either or both of these categories.
For example, if State X were to adjudicate a contract action between a
138. See Sterk, supra note 136, at 1340:
The most literal analysis would require that the forum apply the sister state's
statute in any case where, on the same facts, the sister state would deem the
statute applicable. Whatever the theoretical plausibility of such a rule, how-
ever, its practical result would be nonsensical .... Not only would such a rule
frustrate the interests of each state, but perhaps more importantly, the rule
would do nothing to advance the policy of national unification that underlies
the full faith and credit clause. Such a rule, of course, has never warranted
serious consideration.
See also Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935)
("A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause.., would lead to the
absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced
in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.").
139. See Sterk, supra note 136, at 1344-45. Of course, even if one can find reasons for
interpreting full faith and credit to impose greater requirements on courts of recognition
in the judgments context than in the choice of law context, it does not follow that the full
faith and credit statute should be read literally. As Professor Brilmayer has pointed out:
The greater deference due judgments can be found in a surprising variety of
contexts.
... It is sometimes said that the full faith and credit clause places the Constitu-
tion behind the policies of res judicata and collateral estoppel. But this surely
does not mean that states are obliged to adhere to traditional res judicata rules
without exception.
Brilmayer, supra note 65, at 99-100.




party from State X and a party from State Y, State Y should not be al-
lowed to relitigate matters decided in the State X action, because to do so
would be to frustrate State X's legitimate interest in applying its law to
the contract.
On the other hand, there may be situations in which full faith and
credit values are better served by the imposition of a federal standard,
such as in the case of allegations of jurisdictional defects in the court of
rendition,14 ' or where the application of the plain reading approach
would frustrate the substantive interests of the state of recognition with-
out advancing a substantive interest of the state of rendition,'42 or where
adherence to the preclusion law of the state of rendition would not ad-
vance any preclusion law policies of that court.143 In those situations,
the plain reading approach does not result in a sensible distribution of
power between the affected states.
The plain reading approach would be totally unobjectionable if it were
conceived of as a presumption that, unless factors argue in favor of an-
other choice of law, a court of recognition will apply the preclusion law
of the state of rendition. Alternatively, if it were conceived of as an ap-
proximation of the rules-a rule of thumb which generally produces the
same results as a carefully reasoned approach-there would be nothing
objectionable about it. The problem results from considering the plain
reading to be an iron-clad rule for interstate preclusion. This view can
and does lead to situations in which the preclusion law of the state of
rendition is applied even though doing so frustrates the interests of the
state of recognition without serving any pertinent interest of the state of
rendition.
Moreover, the argument that the price the federal system might pay in
terms of frustrated interests are offset by ease in identification and appli-
cation of the plain reading approach is undercut by the existence of many
exceptions to the plain reading approach. The next section of the Article
catalogs and critically discusses the plain reading approach and its vari-
ous exceptions.
IV. A CANVASSING OF SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court cases in this area are typified
by a general rule that requires the application of the preclusion law of the
state of rendition, but also includes discrete situations in which different
rules are applied. After describing the state of the case law, the Article
will suggest another approach to interstate preclusion that conforms to
the outcome of most of the cases.
141. See infra notes 243-252 and accompanying text.
142. See infra notes 267-273 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 144-159 and
accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 274-283 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 232-242 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 58
FULL FAITH & CREDIT
A. The Plain Reading Approach
The plain reading approach to interstate preclusion problems requires
the court of recognition to treat a prior judgment in precisely the same
way as would the rendering court. The operation of this approach, as
well as some of the problems it raises, are illustrated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Fauntleroy v. Lum. 44
In Fauntleroy, Lum and Searles, two Mississippi citizens, entered into
a contract involving cotton futures14 in Mississippi, to be performed in
Mississippi.146 After a dispute arose under the contract, the parties
agreed to arbitration."4 7 The arbitrators found in favor of Searles, but
Lum declined to pay.' 48 Searles then sought to enforce the award in a
Mississippi court, but dismissed the action after he discovered that such
contracts were unenforceable in Mississippi and could also subject the
participants to criminal liability.149
Searles then sought enforcement of the arbitration award in Missouri.
Personal jurisdiction was obtained by serving Lum while he was passing
through Missouri. '0 Other than this transient jurisdiction over Lum,
Missouri had no other connection with the lawsuit. The Missouri court
refused to consider Lum's argument that the contract was void under
Mississippi law and upheld the arbitral award. 5'
Fauntleroy'52 then sought enforcement of the Missouri judgment in
Mississippi. The Mississippi Supreme Court refused to give effect to the
Missouri judgment because, in its view, the obligation was based on an
illegal transaction." 3 The United States Supreme Court reversed. 54 To
Justice Holmes, the result was dictated by the plain language of the full
144. 210 U.S. 230 (1908). Fauntleroy is often used in casebooks to illustrate the plain
reading approach. See, e.g., R. Cramton, D. Currie & H. Kay, supra note 125 at 588; A.
Lowenfeld, Conflict of Laws 631 (1986); J. Martin, Conflict of Laws 572 (2d ed. 1984).
145. Searles had agreed to guarantee a line of credit issued to Lum by Searles' brother,
a cotton dealer. See Searles v. Lum, 89 Mo. App. 235, 238 (1901). Apparently, Searles'
brother and Lum then engaged in cotton futures transactions, resulting in an indebted-
ness of $596. See id. Searles satisfied the debt and sought reimbursement from Lum. See
id.
146. See Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 233.
147. See id. at 238.
148. See Searles v. Lum, 81 Mo. App. 607, 609 (1899).
149. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 238 (1908) (White, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 238-39.
151. See id. at 239. The Missouri trial court excluded evidence tending to show that
the indebtedness grew out of illegal transactions. See Searles v. Lum, 89 Mo. App. at
239. Lum's theory was that, because the futures contracts were illegal, he had no obliga-
tion to pay debts incurred as a result of those contractual obligations, at least in situations
in which the guarantor was aware of the actions subject to the guarantee. See id. The
appellate court rejected Lum's theory, reasoning that loans made to satisfy debts incurred
by prohibited activities are distinct from the prohibited activities and are enforceable obli-
gations even if the underlying debts are unenforceable. See id.
152. Searles assigned his interest in the judgment to his attorney, Fauntleroy. See





faith and credit statute.155 Although he acknowledged that the holding
would lead to the enforcement of judgments based on mistaken interpre-
tations of foreign law, Holmes baldly asserted that "[m]istakes will be
rare," and that if the Missouri court erred, it had made a "natural
mistake."15
6
The outcome in Fauntleroy seems to address satisfactorily some full
faith and credit values-uniformity in preclusive effect across states, cer-
tainty of result and avoidance of discrimination against out of state judg-
ments. By not allowing reconsideration of the merits of the underlying
claim, the Missouri judgment is treated the same in Mississippi as it
would be in Missouri. Similarly, if collateral attack had been allowed, it
would not have been on a "neutral" theory regarding collateral attack.
The Mississippi court would have been allowed to reexamine the legality
of the futures contract, not because of notions of mutuality of parties,
privity or any other concept derived from Mississippi's tradeoffs of
preclusive and adjudicatory values, but because Mississippi did not like
the result reached in the case.
Mississippi's posture towards the Missouri judgment stands on better
footing, however, when one conceives of the full faith and credit clause
and statute as reflecting a balancing of sovereign interests. Under this
view, a state may adopt whatever preclusion posture it wishes as long as
it does not intrude on the sovereign interests of another state. In situa-
tions of apparent conflict, a federal rule must be imposed to produce an
appropriate uniform solution. When one applies the typical federal rule
used to address choice of law problems to the question of choice of pre-
clusion law, Mississippi's actions seem appropriate.
In the typical choice of law problem, the Court has adopted a "false
conflict" model." 7 Under this approach, a state faced with a choice of
law problem must apply the law of a state which bears some relationship
to the controversy and may apply its own law to the case, even if another
state also has sufficient contacts with the case to justify the application of
its own law. Although some commentators have been generally unsatis-
155. See id. at 236. Actually, Holmes quotes Chief Justice Marshall's statement in
Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 232, 234 (1818), which states that:
the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect in
every other court in the United States, which it had in the State where it was
pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such
state, and none others, could be'pleaded in any other court of the United States.
Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 236. Chief Justice Marshall's statement, of course, is little more
than a restatement of the plain reading approach that had been employed in Mills v.
Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813).
156. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 238 (1908).
157. Brainerd Currie is generally credited with coining the phrase, if not the concept,
of false conflicts. He recognized the similarity between his approach and the Supreme
Court's approach to the full faith and credit clause in the choice of law context. See
Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, reprinted in B. Currie,
supra note 133, at 182-83.
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fled with this laissez-faire approach,15 it is easy to see its appeal. In
cases where two or more states have an interest in having their law ap-
plied-a "true conflict" of laws-there appears to be no national policy
that would dictate which state's law should govern. However, in situa-
tions in which only one state has an interest in having its law applied, a
false conflict is presented and the law of the interested state must be
applied.
This is not true in the judgments context. The national policy of uni-
formity could function as an effective second order principle to resolve
true conflicts. It is possible and desirable to have a national judgments
recognition rule in situations in which more than one state has an interest
in applying its own preclusion rules. Any of the rules discussed earlier-
federal preclusion law, the preclusion law of the rendering state, or pre-
clusion law of the state of recognition-would satisfactorily address
problems raised in situations presenting true conflicts.
But what of "false conflict" situations-where only one state has an
interest in having its preclusion law applied to the case? In such situa-
tions, should the policy of uniformity, as expressed in the federal preclu-
sion rule, trump the interest of the only interested state?
Fauntleroy is a case of that type. What interest does Missouri have in
precluding Mississippi from reexamining a determination of Mississippi
law involving a Mississippi cause of action over a Mississippi contract
entered into between citizens of Mississippi? Indeed, if the case took
place today the harder question would be whether Missouri had the
power to adjudicate the case at all. 159 The only interest Missouri appears
to have in the enforcement of its judgment is the integrity of the judg-
ment itself-that Mississippi appears to be undermining the authority of
Missouri's courts.
The power of this argument lies in discrimination against the state
judgment. In Fauntleroy, the Mississippi court appeared to discriminate
against the Missouri judgment insofar as Mississippi probably would not
have allowed collateral attack of the prior judgment had it been rendered
158. See supra note 125.
159. The facts indicate that all the relevant "contacts" from a jurisdictional perspec-
tive were with Mississippi, or at least were not with Missouri. It is known that jurisdic-
tion over the defendant was eflected on the basis of Lum's transient presence in Missouri.
See Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 234. Although some have questioned whether this temporary
presence in a jurisdiction remains a sufficient basis for the assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion, it unquestionably was considered sufficient during the time of the Fauntleroy case
and it has generally been held to be sufficient in modem cases. See, e.g., Amusement
Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 1985); Aluminal Indus. v. Newtown
Com. Assocs., 89 F.R.D. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga.
732, 734, 273 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1980). But see Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death War-
rant for the Transient Rule of in Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 Vill. L. Rev. 38, 60 (1979)
(arguing that transient jurisdiction does not survive the Supreme Court's decision in Shaf-
fer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Juris-
diction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 289 (1956) (discussing
shortcomings of transient jurisdiction rule).
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by a domestic court. But, of course, a domestic court would not have
reached the same judgment; had a lower court in Mississippi reached the
same determination as had the Missouri court, it would have been re-
versed on appeal. That is the point of the collateral attack in this in-
stance; it permits Mississippi to correct an erroneous interpretation of
Mississippi law on an issue of importance to Mississippi. If Mississippi is
unable to collaterally attack the Missouri judgment, the parties will have
been able to validate behavior deemed to be illegal and unenforceable by
Mississippi.
If discrimination in this context is defined as merely giving a foreign
judgment different treatment than a court would give a domestic judg-
ment, then there is discrimination in Fauntleroy. The ultimate question,
therefore, is what should be meant by discrimination? If a court treats
judgments differently because of specific, justifiable differences in them,
the varying treatment should not be viewed as discrimination. In Faun-
tleroy, the difference in treatment is a result of the substantive law ap-
plied by the Missouri court and not because it is a Missouri judgment;
the difference is thus justified by Mississippi's strong interest in the cor-
rect application of its own law.
The full faith and credit issue is thus reduced to whether the national
interest in uniformity and certainty combined with Missouri's interest in
having Mississippi respect its erroneous interpretation of Mississippi law
outweighs Mississippi's interest in correcting an error on a matter of
great importance to Mississippi. In a case such as Fauntleroy, where
only the state of recognition is interested in the outcome of the case,
collateral attack should be permissible and, as will be shown in the next
part of the Article, such a result is consistent with the totality of Supreme
Court case law.
B. Exceptions to the Plain Reading Approach
The Supreme Court has departed from its literal reading of the full
faith and credit statute in certain discrete situations. After briefly dis-
cussing each of these exceptions, the Article proposes a common expla-
nation: courts of recognition need not be precluded from reexamining
issues when they have a strong interest in doing so and the court of rendi-
tion has no interest in preventing reexamination.
1. The Land Taboo Cases
The land taboo'" cases generally involve restrictions on the preclusive
effect that states must give to decrees that affect land in the state of rec-
ognition. The land taboo reached its zenith in Clarke v. Clarke. 6' In
Clarke, Mrs. Clarke, a domiciliary of South Carolina, died leaving an
estate consisting of real and personal property located in South Carolina
160. See R. Crampton, D. Currie & H. Kay, supra note 125, at 637.
161. 178 U.S. 186 (1900).
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and real property located in Connecticut. Her will was probated in
South Carolina and provided that her estate be divided in equal shares to
her husband and two children, Nancy and Julia. Three months after
Mrs. Clarke's death, Julia died intestate. Litigation then ensued to deter-
mine the proper disposition of the estates of Mrs. Clarke and Julia.
A South Carolina court decreed that Mrs. Clarke's will worked an
equitable conversion of all her real estate, wherever located, into person-
alty at the time of her death.162 The husband and the daughters were all
represented in the proceedings. 163 A second proceeding was then
brought in Connecticut to determine the proper disposition of the Con-
necticut property. The Connecticut court held that Julia's interest in the
Connecticut real estate passed to Nancy by Connecticut's rules of intes-
tate succession.'"
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held that Mrs. Clarke's
will did not work an equitable conversion of her real property into per-
sonalty, at least as to real property situated in Connecticut. 165 Conse-
quently, upon Mrs. Clarke's death, Julia was vested with a one-third
interest in the Connecticut property. In doing so, the court acknowl-
edged that if the Connecticut property were deemed to be personalty,
South Carolina law would determine its disposition. 16 6 Under South
Carolina's rules of intestate succession, this property would have passed
in equal shares to Nancy and Mr. Clarke.167
At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Connecticut had given
full faith and credit to the South Carolina court's determination that
Mrs. Clarke's will worked an equitable conversion of the real property
into personalty. The Court found no full faith and credit violation be-
cause South Carolina lacked power to determine the status of land lo-
cated in Connecticut.1 68 There are at least two possible interpretations of
Clarke. One reading posits that a judgment encumbering land outside
the state of rendition need not be recognized by the state of recognition
(and state of situs of the land). 169 This reading depends upon the view
that a state court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or venue 170 to adjudi-
cate claims relating to land outside the state. This view is thus a specie of
the intersystem preclusion rules concerning jurisdictional defects in the
162. See id. at 190.
163. Mr. Clarke sued as executor of Mrs. Clarke's estate and as trustee of the estate of
Nancy. A guardian ad litem was then appointed for Nancy. See id. at 187-88.
164. As in the South Carolina proceedings, Nancy was represented by a guardian ad
litem. See id. at 188.
165. See id. at 190.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 195.
169. See id. ("Having a right to decide these questions, [Connecticut] was not con-
strained to adopt the construction of the will which had been announced by the court of
South Carolina.").
170. See Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 662 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8411).
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rendering state. 171 Unless one somehow concludes, however, that Nancy
lacked effective participation in the South Carolina proceeding,' 72 it is
difficult to see why the South Carolina decree is subject to collateral at-
tack, while other allegations that a court lacked power to act are not
subject to attack if the parties participated in the first suit. 173
The more likely reading is that a state court has the power, assuming
the existence of personal jurisdiction over the parties, to render a binding
in personam judgment determining the rights and obligations of the par-
ties with respect to land situated outside the state. Nonetheless, an act of
the state purporting to execute the judgment may be refused recognition
in the situs state. In Fall v. Eastin,17 4 although the Court indicated that
a prior Washington judgment concerning the ownership of land in Ne-
braska would have preclusive effect on the merits in an action to clear
title as between the parties appearing in the Washington action, a deed
conveying the land drawn by a Washington commissioner to enforce the
Washington judgment need not be recognized by a Nebraska court. 75
The rationale for the Fall holding seems to be that a state's interest in
administering its process for recording titles to land and land convey-
ances is so strong that it justifies the state's refusal to recognize an act by
another state that interferes with that interest. 176 This interest, which is
concerned with providing an orderly way of ascertaining ownership of
property for taxation purposes as well as facilitating an orderly succes-
sion of title across property holders, is important from both a state and
private party perspective. 177 From the point of view of the state of rendi-
tion, as long as the determinations made in its original judgment must be
respected, it is not offended if its actions to enforce the judgment are not
respected. Similarly, the result of Fall for future litigants presents few
problems. Enforcing the judgment only entails bringing a separate en-
171. See infra notes 232-254 and accompanying text.
172. Justice White suggests that, although a guardian ad litem was appointed to repre-
sent Nancy in the South Carolina proceeding, the guardian lacked authority to act for her
on matters extending beyond South Carolina. See Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186, 193
(1900). No support is offered for this proposition. Assuming that it is true, however, the
guardian had an opportunity to contest the scope of his power in the South Carolina
proceeding and so, under traditional doctrine, there had been a waiver of the issue.
173. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963) (judgment entitled to full faith
and credit even as to questions of jurisdiction if they have been fully and fairly litigated).
174. 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
175. See id. at 11-12.
176. See Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev.
620, 639-40 (1954); Rodgers & Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1363, 1368
(1967).
177. There is also a federalism component to the land taboo cases in that it was gener-
ally thought that a state had exclusive jurisdiction over property within its borders. See
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). Thus, a state that purported to directly affect
property outside its borders exceeded its jurisdiction, even if it had in personam jurisdic-
tion over the owner of the property.
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forcement action in a court in the state of situs. 178
Nonetheless, even the Fall type of land taboo represents a shift from
the plain reading rule. Under Fall, the court of recognition can refuse to
enforce the judgment, at least as to the specific remedy, if it determines
that the prevailing party in the original action is not entitled to receive
title to the property. This could happen, for example, if the court of
recognition determines that the losing party did not have title to the
property at the commencement of the original action, or that title had
passed to someone else prior to the date of enforcement. Presumably, in
making these or other determinations of ownership, the state of recogni-
tion would be free to apply its own law and not the law of the state of
rendition. As a result, a state court could legitimately refuse to confer
title to a prevailing party if it had determined, under its own law, that
there had been an intervening bona fide purchaser of the property for
value.
2. Workers' Compensation
The Supreme Court has fashioned another exception to a literal read-
ing of the full faith and credit statute in the workers' compensation area.
In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,179 the Court employed a plain read-
ing of the statute to preclude a state from using its workers' compensa-
tion law to supplement an award received in another state under that
state's workers' compensation scheme. The Court held that, because the
workers' compensation scheme of the state of rendition would preclude
additional awards, the state of recognition must also view the issue as so
precluded. ' 80
Less than five years later, however, in Industrial Commission v. Mc-
Cartin,18 1 the Court backed away from the result in Magnolia. The
Court held that, at least in the workers' compensation area, unless the
state of rendition clearly evinces an intent to preclude additional awards
under the laws of other states, other states may employ their own work-
ers' compensation laws to supplement awards."'s The McCartin logic is
difficult to discern and problematic. Some have read it as a special rule
dealing only with state administrative proceedings. 183 Under this inter-
pretation, because the workers' compensation board in a state typically is
not empowered to make an award under a scheme other than its own, the
worker was never afforded an opportunity to argue in favor of employing
a different workers' compensation scheme in his case. Therefore, there
was no judicial proceeding purporting to extinguish rights of recovery
178. See Currie, supra note 176, at 672-76.
179. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
180. See id. at 441-42.
181. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
182. See id. at 626-28.
183. See Reese & Johnson, supra note 95, at 176-77.
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under other states' workers' compensation law. 84
The other explanation of McCartin rests on the special nature of work-
ers' compensation. Workers' compensation laws are legislated solutions
to matters of tort law. As such, they displace the common law to the
extent that they apply."15 When a workers' compensation scheme pur-
ports to create an exclusive remedy for a worker's injury, as in Magnolia,
the claim for workers' compensation extinguishes all other claims. How-
ever, where the workers' compensation scheme does not purport to ex-
clude other remedies, full faith and credit is not violated when a worker
avails himself of those remedies. In McCartin, for example, the workers'
compensation scheme was held to displace only a claim for recovery
under Illinois tort law."8 6 Because it did not purport to extinguish a
claim under other states' workers' compensation laws, the award did not
preclude supplementation in other states.
This is creative reasoning of the highest order. As Brainard Currie
concluded, "the Court ... reached a desirable result at some expense in
terms of judicial candor and fidelity to statutory language." '187 Although
the Court limited its holding to workers' compensation schemes, there is
no principled reason for such a limitation.18 1 Even if one could interpret
184. Of course, most workers' compensation schemes include a right of review in the
state courts. It is far from clear whether a claim in such a proceeding arguing that an-
other states' workers' compensation law should be applied would be allowed. Under the
McCartin logic, if such a claim were raised and if the state court denied recovery, sister
states would be bound by the judgment. This is so because such a judgment would be the
equivalent to unmistakable language that the workers' compensation law of the state of
rendition was the exclusive remedy for those claimants who avail themselves of the
scheme. See also Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1982) (judi-
cial determination reviewing state administrative action precludes relitigation of the is-
sues in federal court).
185. This very notion that common-law rules operate unless displaced by legislation
and that one should view the scope of displacement narrowly may be out of step with
modem conceptions of governmental power. Under the modem view, all coercive gov-
ernmental power emanates from legislative bodies, who generally are more accountable to
the citizenry. See, eg., A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16-23 (1962) (judicial
review in tension with the majoritarian assumptions of a democracy); J. Ely, Democracy
and Distrust 73-105 (1980) (suggesting a limited scope of judicial review over most areas
of law because legislatures are more accountable to the citzenry then are courts). Courts
enjoy a subordinate power to interpret laws made by the legislature and to "fill in gaps"
left by the legislature in legislative schemes. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). Under either view, however, it would be legitimate for a
court to "legislate" using common-law rules in areas not covered by a statutory scheme.
186. See Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 630 (1947).
187. Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgements: A Role for Congress, 1964 S.
Ct. Rev. 89, 119.
188. One explanation is that workers' compensation laws are to be liberally construed
in favor of workers. See McCartin, 330 U.S. at 628. However, even assuming the truth of
this proposition, this would amount to a general pronouncement on a matter of state law
made by the Supreme Court, a federal court. This would appear to be at least in serious
tension with Erie and the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982) ("except where
the Constitution ... or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, [the laws of the
several states] shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States.").
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opaque language setting forth the preclusionary effect of judgments, one
is left with disquieting notions of federalism. In McCartin, we are asked
to believe that statutory language providing that "[n]o common law or
statutory right to recover damages ... for injury or death sustained by
any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee,
other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any em-
ployee who is covered by the provisions of this Act,"1'9 bars common-
law claims everywhere and statutory claims only if they involve other
Illinois statutes.1 90 We are then asked to accept the idea that one state
may determine the preclusive effect that its judgments are to have in
other states. 191
Assuming the validity of the notion that a state may determine, or at
least limit,192 the preclusive effects of its judgments, it is difficult to see
why the principle is not employed more generally. For example, can it
not be assumed that, unless the state of rendition explicitly legislates
otherwise, the preclusion laws of the state of recognition may be used to
determine the effect of the judgment? Why should we ever assume that a
judgment under the laws of the state of rendition bars further actions
under the laws of other states?
In the face of dissatisfaction over the distinctions drawn in McCar-
189. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, 138.5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1986).
190. An explicit provision for resolving statutory conflicts would be highly unusual.
Indeed, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the reference to statutory remedies is an
interstate as well as intrastate conflict of law rule.
191. While this aspect of McCartin has generated concern among the Supreme Court
and some commentators, see Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 271 &
n. 15 (1980), it is not particularly problematic, at least within the limits of the McCartin
situation. Surely it is within the power of the legislature of the state of rendition to set the
scope of the laws it enacts, so long as, in doing so, it acts constitutionally. Assuming that
the Illinois legislature has limited the preclusive effect of workers' compensation awards
so as to permit additional awards under the laws of other states, what is unconstitutional
about its law? There would appear to be no due process problem because the employer's
"right" to rely on the Illinois workers' compensation award is explicitly conditioned by
the statute itself. Furthermore, it hardly amounts to a full faith and credit violation when
a state of rendition permits a state of recognition to give its judgment less faith and credit
than would otherwise be given to it.
The real problem in McCartin is that no one really believes that the legislature has
legislated the preclusive effect of workers' compensation awards. Thus, the question be-
comes one of a state of recognition disingenuously inferring that the legislature of the
state of rendition did not want the usual rule of preclusion to apply. This is a potentially
mischievous way of subverting the intent of the full faith and credit statute. It is mischie-
vous not only because the state of recognition is not faithfully applying the law of the
state of rendition, but also because there is no way to police the actions of the state of
recognition. The only court in a position to police the area, the Supreme Court, is not
likely to review many such cases because of its limited capacity to hear cases and because
of the lack of a federal question, the underlying issue in the cases being, in essence, a
dispute over the meaning of the law of the state of rendition.
192. McCartin does not address a situation where a state seeks to have its judgments




tin,19 3 the Court reconsidered the issue in Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Co.194 Although the Court could not agree on a new rationale to
support its result, 95 Justice Stevens' plurality opinion attempted to re-
cast the McCartin rationale by employing state interest analysis.
Although only a plurality opinion, it represents the most cogent analysis
of the Court's full faith and credit approach.196
Thomas involved an injured worker who could have obtained an
award under the workers' compensation laws of either Virginia or the
District of Columbia.1 97 Thomas initially pursued an award in Vir-
ginia.198 He later sought a supplemental award in the District of Colum-
bia. Although the case could have been decided in favor of Thomas by
employing the analysis in McCartin,199 Stevens used the case as an op-
portunity to reexamine the purposes of full faith and credit.
Justice Stevens cast the full faith and credit problem as one in which
national policies mediated a conffict between sometimes competing state
interests. 2" The McCartin approach was unsatisfactory because it al-
lowed the state of rendition to determine the effect of its judgment in
other states, "an unwarranted delegation to the States of this Court's re-
193. See supra note 188. Reese and Johnson have attempted to supply a coherent ra-
tionale for the result in McCartin. See Reese & Johnson, supra note 95, at 161. One of
the rationales, that "the mandate of full faith and credit will on occasion give way before
the paramount interests of an individual state," id., was found to be "logically accepta-
ble" but vague. See id. at 164. Professor Reese, reporter for the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, incorporated the concept in what became section 103 of the Restate-
ment. The idea has not been universally well received. See infra note 261.
194. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
195. Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart and Blackmun.
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, concurred in the result
reached by Stevens. Justices Marshall and Rehnquist dissented.
196. Other commentators have not been favorably impressed by Stevens' opinion. The
most thorough analysis is contained in Sterk, supra note 136. Student notes and com-
ments include: Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.- Worker's Compensation Chal-
lenges Full Faith and Credit Application, 1981 Det. C.L. Rev. 947; Supplemental
Worker's Compensation Awards and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Thomas v. Wash-
ington Gas Light Co., 12 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 813 (1981); Thomas v. Washington Gas Light
Co.- A Reexamination of the Constitutionality of Supplemental Worker's Compensation
Awards Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 8 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 557 (1981).
197. The worker lived in the District of Columbia and the employer's principal place
of business was the District of Columbia. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 279. Under Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), the District of Co-
lumbia had a sufficient relationship to the employer and employee to justify applying its
workers' compensation law. Under Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), Virginia, the place of the accident, also had a sufficient
interest in the controversy to apply its workers' compensation law to the accident.
198. The extent to which Thomas actually "chose" the Virginia scheme is unclear. He
was admitted to a hospital in Virginia and may have "selected" Virginia law by signing
hospital admitting forms. In any event, the voluntariness of Thomas' selection of the
Virginia remedy was not crucial to the Supreme Court's analysis.
199. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell, took this ap-
proach. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 286 (White, J., concurring).
200. See id. at 271 & n.15.
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sponsibility for the final arbitration of full faith and credit questions."' '
Full faith and credit was thus a federal question to be determined by
federal standards.2" 2
Stevens did not explicitly define a set of national policies, a definite
standard, or a list of purposes underlying full faith and credit.20 3 The
opinion implicitly adopts an approach that focuses on competing state
interests.2° Borrowing from the full faith and credit cases involving
choice of law,205 Stevens invoked "[t]he principle that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require a State to subordinate its own compensa-
tion policies to those of another State .... ,20' He then engaged in an
interest analysis to determine whether and to what extent Virginia's in-
terest in its judgment should preclude the District of Columbia from sup-
plementing the award.207
One can disagree with the specific conclusions that Stevens drew from
his interest analysis, 20 but the test itself seems sound. First, Stevens
201. Id. at 271.
202. Stevens suggests that full faith and credit analysis is complicated by the power
delegated to Congress to prescribe the effect of state judgments. See id. at 272 n. 18. He
appears willing to accept that "by virtue of the full faith and credit obligations of the
several States [imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1738], a State is permitted to determine the extra-
territorial effect of its judgments; but it may only do so indirectly, by prescribing the
effect of its judgment within the state." Id. at 270. Nonetheless, he refuses to read the
full faith and credit statute to require the application of the preclusion law of the state of
rendition in this case. "We simply conclude that the substantial interests of the second
State in these circumstances should not be overridden by another State through an unnec-
essarily aggressive application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause ... ." Id. at 285
(citing Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 227 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting)). This
suggests that Stevens is willing to stray from a plain reading of the full faith and credit
statute when doing so effectuates the purposes of full faith and credit.
203. Stevens does cite and quote approvingly several prior Court opinions and schol-
arly articles, most notably Reese & Johnson, supra note 95. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 271
n.15, 272, 278 n.23, 279.
204. See id. at 277-86.
205. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-24 (1979); Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380
U.S. 39, 40-42 (1965); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 411 (1955); Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500-05 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n
v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 543-45 (1935).
206. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 279 (1980).
207. See id. at 280-86.
208. The author disagrees with Stevens' analysis minimizing Virginia's interest in plac-
ing a ceiling on the liability of employers doing business in the state. Stevens argues that,
because an injured worker from another state could initiate proceedings in the other state,
Virginia's interest, although valid, could be subverted by well-advised workers. See id. at
284. That argument is flawed because it allows admittedly loose choice of law rules to
affect the recognition of judgments issue. Although well-advised workers could subvert
Virginia's interests by proceeding initially in the District of Columbia, when suit is
brought in Virginia, Virginia is entitled to advance its interests and its interests are re-
flected in any final award. Thus, applying Stevens' test, the author would, conclude that,
although the District of Columbia surely has an interest in the accident sufficient to en-
able it to apply its own law ab initio, once Virginia adjudicates the claim, Virginia's inter-
est in the judgment must be respected.
Despite this disagreement with the result in Thomas and the specific application of
Stevens' interest analysis, the author believes that Stevens has identified the correct test.
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downplayed preclusion values and focused on full faith and credit values.
This adds considerable clarity to the analysis. For example, certainty in
the judgment was dismissed as a red herring. Stevens observed that, be-
cause the employer knew that it could be susceptible to recovery under
either the District of Columbia or Virginia scheme, it had to have
planned for recovery under the more generous scheme.20 9 To preclude
further recovery under the guise of certainty and repose for litigants
would only serve to give the employer the benefit of an employee's foolish
decision. It would have no effect on the employer's actions. Similarly,
the effect on repose would be minimal because all issues litigated in the
first proceeding would be binding in the second proceeding; the facts and
all legal determinations of the Virginia court would be binding in the
District of Columbia proceeding.210 Stevens correctly saw the circularity
of the argument that full faith and credit should protect litigants'
"rights" in a judgment because it depends on an assumption that such
rights exist. A litigant's right in a judgment only exists to the extent that
the preclusion laws of the court of rendition or the court of recognition
confer such rights. The full faith and credit clause does not ensure en-
forcement of these rights, but helps determine the regime of law that
gives content to these rights in a judgment. To assume that rights in a
judgment vest according to the preclusion law of the state of rendition is
to assume that which must be determined.
Nor does Stevens conflate notions of finality and efficiency with full
faith and credit. Although full faith and credit will often have the effect
of facilitating efficiency and finality by precluding relitigation of issues
and claims, efficiency and finality cannot be seen as the goals of full faith
and credit.2 1'
Nor are any federal interests articulated. Again, this makes sense.
See dliso Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and
Federal Law, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1315, 1324 n.52 (1981) ("Justice Stevens was undoubtedly
right in principle" but he "misapplied this principle to the facts of Thomas, because he
disregarded a valid internal law policy-releasing the insurer from further liability of any
kind.")
209. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 279-80. Unlike Stevens' conclusion that the possiblity of
the higher award negated Virginia's interest in limiting recovery, it is valid to point out
that, because of the possibility that District of Columbia law would be applied, the only
expectations an employer could form could only be formed upon final judgment. At that
point, the question becomes whether the employer then has a right to recognition of the
judgment in a particular fashion. This smacks of the same "vested rights" approach to
the choice of law that has been discredited by courts and commentators. See, e.g., Currie,
On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, reprinted in B. Currie, supra note 133, at 3,
6 (crediting Walter Wheeler Cook as having discredited the vested rights theory of Joseph
Beale, as reflected in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, "as thoroughly as the intellect
of one man can ever discredit the intellectual product of another"). Stevens notes this by
pointing to the Court's move, in the workers' compensation area, from the vested rights
approach of Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), to Alaska Packers and
Pacific Employers. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 279 n.24.
210. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 281.
211. So, recognizing the Virginia award would preclude reexamination of the facts.
See id. at 283. However, an unraised claim would not be merged into the judgment
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There are no independent federal interests to be served by full faith and
credit in this case.21 Rather, the federal interest is in having a method of
resolving interstate conflicts. This, in turn, refocuses the effort on ascer-
taining state interests and resolving them in a sensible way. Stevens at-
tempts to do exactly that.
Combining Justice Stevens' emphasis on state interests with the dictate
of the full faith and credit statute, one ultimately comes up with a "false
conflict" test.2 13 If the state of rendition has an interest in having its
judgment recognized according to its rules of preclusion and the state of
recognition has no interest in applying its preclusion rules, the rules of
the state of rendition apply. Similarly, if the state of rendition has no
interest in having its rules of preclusion applied in the state of recognition
and the state of recognition has an interest in applying its own rules of
preclusion, it may do so. In the true conflict situation-where both
states are interested-the full faith and credit statute directs that the pre-
clusion law of the state of rendition should be applied. If neither state
has an interest in having its preclusion law applied, the statute again dic-
tates that the law of the state of recognition should apply.
3. Equity Decrees
Although the full faith and credit statute requires that full faith and
credit be given to "judicial proceedings" and not just judgments at
law,21 4 proceedings in equity traditionally have been subject to a number
of exceptions to full recognition. First, to the extent that equity decrees
may be modified, they need not be recognized.21 5 This is contrary to the
letter if not the spirit of the traditional reading of the statute. Because
the state of recognition must give the same faith and credit to the equity
decree as the state of rendition would, it should be able to modify the
equity decree if the state of rendition could do so. However, it does not
follow that, just because the decree can be modified, it should be. The
decision whether to modify the judgment thus becomes the key question
unless an independent reason, such as the interests of the rendering state, argued in favor
of preclusion. See id. at 283 & nn. 29-30.
212. It could be argued that, because all choice of law and judgment recognition issues
potentially affect the ability of persons and businesses to transact their affairs across state
borders, the full faith and credit clause should be used to advance federal substantive
values. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. Similarly, choice of law and judg-
ment recognition issues affecting private international transactions could give rise to fed-
eral concerns. See Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International Law: Toward a
Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 165 (1988). These
types of concerns are best addressed through statutory or common-law approaches based
on an enumerated federal power, such as the commerce clause or the foreign relations
power, rather than using full faith and credit which, by its terms, deals with interstate
relations.
213. See infra notes 261-266 and accompanying text.
214. See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 87 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).
215. See id.; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1910).
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and one that, contrary to the plain reading approach, is answered by
focussing on the interests of the state of recognition.
If the plain reading approach were applied, an equity decree would be
modified only if the court of rendition would similarly modify it. In ad-
dition, any such modifications would mirror the modifications the court
of rendition would have made. In short, the court of recognition would
use the choice of law rules of the state of rendition. That this does not
tend to occur underscores that the court of recognition is using its equity
powers to achieve its own policy objectives.216
This might explain why Justice Stone's dissent in Yarborough v. Yar-
borough2" 7 has garnered so much support over the years.218 Yarborough
involved an unmodifiable Georgia child support decree. Modification of
the decree was subsequently sought in South Carolina, where the child
was domiciled. Because the Georgia decree was not modifiable, the
Court could not rely on the usual exception to full faith and credit.21 9
Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, found that, because Georgia
could not modify the decree, neither could South Carolina.220
Justice Stone viewed the problem not as whether the daughter's claim
had merged in the prior Georgia judgment, but as whether "the full faith
and credit clause gives sanction to... control [by Georgia] of the inter-
nal affairs of [South Carolina]." '221 As Stone saw it, states had an interest
in assuring adequate support for children domiciled there. Georgia thus
had an interest in adjudicating the issue initially, and, had the child re-
mained in Georgia, South Carolina could not have allowed modification
of the decree.222 But, when the child changed domicile, the state of the
216. The problem is often masked by the fact that, in many domestic relations situa-
tions, the legal standards governing the parties' conduct is the same across jurisdictions.
In child custody matters, for example, the standard is typically to choose the custodial
parent that is in the best interests of the child. Parents are well aware, however, that a
state court will often view the locally-domiciled parent as the better alternative. This
problem prompted Congress to enact the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3569 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982)), in order to
articulate the full faith and credit given to child custody determinations.
217. 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933).
218. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 103 reporter's note (1971).
219. See Yarborough, 290 U.S. at 212-13.
220. The majority opinion specifically limited its holding to the situation before it and
did not consider whether the decree could be modified if both the father and the child
were domiciled in South Carolina. See id. at 213. This suggests that the Court conceived
of the issue as one of competing state interests and that, on the Yarborough facts, the state
of rendition had an interest in having its decree remain unmodifiable. If both parties were
no longer domiciled in the state of rendition, it would lose this interest, enabling the state
of recognition to act on its interest in providing adequate support for children in its bor-
ders.
Under this reading of Justice Brandeis' opinion, the only thing separating him from
Justice Stone is the results of a weighing of state interests. Both of them reject the idea
that the modifiability of a judgment is a right that somehow vests in the litigants and also
reject the idea that the full faith and credit statute compels the result.
221. Id. at 214 (Stone, J., dissenting).
222. See id. at 227.
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child's domicile acquired an interest in her welfare.223 As a result, South
Carolina had an interest in modifying the decree. As Justice Stone recog-
nized, however, the ultimate question is "whether the support and main-
tenance of a minor child, domiciled in South Carolina, is so peculiarly a
subject of domestic concern that Georgia law cannot impair South Caro-
lina's authority. '
224
Stone saw this as a false conflict. Georgia lost any interest it had in the
welfare of the child when the child moved to South Carolina.225 Thus,
the matter was solely a South Carolina concern and South Carolina was
free to modify the decree and award the daughter additional support pay-
ments as South Carolina saw fit.226 One may disagree with Stone's as-
sessment of state interests 227 but his test appears to be sound.228
Thus, Stone's dissent in Yarborough shows that the real reason for not
recognizing equitable decrees is to allow the state of recognition to give
effect to its policy concerns, particularly when changes in circumstances,
such as a change in party domicile, weaken the interests of the state of
rendition in its judgment.229
223. See id.
224. Id. at 220.
225. See id. at 227.
226. See Reese & Johnson, supra note 95, at 157 (arguing that the welfare of the child
is "peculiarly" the concern of the child's domicile). One can also conceptualize Stone's
approach in terms of claim preclusion. While domiciled in Georgia, the child had a cause
of action, based on Georgia law, for maintenance and support. When she moved to
South Carolina, she acquired a new cause of action under South Carolina law. This cause
of action did not merge into the Georgia judgment because she was unable to assert the
claim in the prior proceeding. Accordingly, she may pursue her "new" claim in South
Carolina. See Yarborough, 290 U.S. at 221 ("The measure of the duty is the needs of the
child and the ability of the parent to meet those needs at the very time when performance
of the duty is invoked."); see also id. at 214 n.1 (suggesting that the Georgia proceeding
adjudicated a right of the mother, not the child, and so "could have no effect upon the
present litigation").
227. It is not clear why Georgia lacks an interest in having its policy of having final
determinations of maintenance and support involving Georgia parents enforced in South
Carolina. Suppose, for example, that the daughter had been domiciled in South Carolina
at the time of the initial Georgia decree. Surely a Georgia court could adjudicate the
issue of maintenance and support as an incident to a bilateral divorce. See E. Scoles & P.
Hay, Conflict of Laws 508-09 (1982) (incidents of divorce are in personam obligations
based on transitory actions). The Georgia domicile of the husband could constitutionally
support the application of Georgia law. It is difficult to understand why Georgia could
have a constitutionally sufficient interest in applying its law in such a case, but would
have no interest in having its judgment enforced.
228. Brainerd Currie concluded that Yarborough was "perfectly outrageous [in its] re-
sult" because "clearly no state should thus be allowed to interfere with the important
interest of another state in child support." Currie, supra note 184, at 118.
229. Stone's dissent in Yarborough raises an issue not squarely present in typical equi-
table decree case-party expectations. In the typical equity case, we could say that liti-
gants seeking to avoid relitigation had no expectation of repose; the decrees were
modifiable by their own terms. In Yarborough, the father might well have developed an
expectation of repose by having obtained a nonmodifiable judgment in Georgia. Justice
Stone baldly asserts "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enable a father, by the expe-
dient of choosing a domicile other than the state where the child is rightfully domiciled,
to avoid the duty which that state may impose for support of his child." Yarborough v.
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The second reason given for denying preclusive effect to equitable de-
crees is that such decrees are remedial in nature and the court of recogni-
tion is free to fashion its own remedies. This argument sweeps too
broadly. It is probably true that a court need not enforce an equitable
decree that it could not itself make.23 However, if a court recognizes the
remedial device in general, the plain reading approach would argue that
it may not discriminate in its use of that device.231
4. Procedural Matters
Although the full faith and credit statute has been read to require
courts of recognition to refer to the law of the court of rendition to deter-
mine the effect of a judgment, it has long been held that the manner of
enforcement is subject to the laws of the court of recognition.232 So, for
example, whether the courts of the state of recognition may hear a partic-
ular action for enforcement is determined by the law of the state of recog-
nition, subject to certain constraints.233 Similarly, the state of
recognition may apply its statute of limitations in enforcing foreign judg-
ments, even if shorter than the statute of limitations of the state of
rendition. 3
The theory behind this exception to the plain reading approach is that
the state of recognition's interests in regulating the operation of its court
system is paramount. Any countervailing interests by the state of rendi-
tion are adequately handled by the rule of no discrimination against the
judgments of the state of rendition.
Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 225 (1983). But the father did not move to avoid an obliga-
tion of child support-he litigated the issue in a competent court. He then claimed that
his obligation had been determined and rights to support had vested in that judgment.
The conflict was caused not by his move to Georgia, but by the child's establishment of a
South Carolina domicile.
This aspect of Stone's dissent is most troubling, and his reasoning here appears to be
flawed. See supra note 227. The author would argue that, although rights to a particular
state's preclusion law do not inhere in a judgment, see supra notes 85-91 and accompany-
ing text, there might be equitable considerations that would argue in favor of applying the
preclusion law of the state of rendition in certain circumstances, even if full faith and
credit would not demand it. See infra notes 284-285 and accompanying text.
230. Cf Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951) (availability of a forum deter-
mined by the forum's jurisdictional rules); McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312,
324 (1839) (court of recognition may apply its own statute of limitations to an action to
enforce a sister state judgment).
231. Cf Hughes, 341 U.S. at 612-13 (Wisconsin must recognize cause of action based
on Illinois wrongful death statute if it recognizes domestic wrongful death cases).
232. See Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 176, at 1367 (citing as examples door closing
statutes, statutes of limitations, forum non conveniens, rules governing capacity, bonding
requirements and availability of remedies).
233. Under Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951), and First Nat'l Bank v. United
Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396, 398 (1952), a state may not discriminate against recognition of
foreign law. However, non discriminatory limits on state court jurisdiction, such as door-
closing statutes, presumably could validly operate to preclude the recognition of foreign
judgments without running afoul of full faith and credit.
234. See McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 311, 327 (1839).
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The key question, of course, is when is a preclusion rule "procedural"
and when is it "substantive"? It smacks of battles fought in other are-
nas;.35 in the Erie doctrine, the Court abandoned bright-line tests in
favor of an approach that focused on the balancing of competing state
and federal interests. 36 In the choice of law area, the substance/proce-
dure device has been widely seen as an escape device that allows the fo-
rum to choose its own law in order to further its substantive policies.23 7
The entire enterprise is dubious in the preclusion context because preclu-
sion law itself is generally considered to be a matter of procedure, tradi-
tionally defined. 3
Interestingly, an argument based on the procedure exception was
raised and rejected in Fauntleroy v. Lum.239 Lum argued that, because a
Mississippi statute provided that futures contracts "shall not be enforced
by any court," the Mississippi courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the en-
forcement action.' 4 Justice Holmes seemed to acknowledge that, had
the Mississippi statute been jurisdictional in nature, the statute could
235. See generally Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693 (1974)
(Erie doctrine); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 122-44 (1971) (substance/
procedure distinction in choice of law).
236. Compare Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (adopting an effect
on outcome test) with Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537-39
(1958) (adopting an approach that balances state and federal interests).
237. See, eg., R. Cramton, D. Currie & H. Kay, supra note 125, at 58, 94-117 (placing
discussion of the substance/procedure distinction under the subsection heading "Tradi-
tional Practice: A Survey of Escape Devices"). But see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486
U.S. 717, 722-29 (1988) (reaffirming the propriety of the substance/procedure
distinction).
238. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 5 (1982). The problem is compounded
when preclusion issues are combined with Erie issues. Compare Degnan, supra note 67,
at 769 (arguing that because preclusion rules are procedural, judgments rendered by fed-
eral courts, even if sitting in diversity, are to be recognized in all other courts, in accord-
ance with federal preclusion law) with Burbank, supra note 65, at 762-63, 800 (arguing
that judgments rendered by federal courts sitting in diversity are to be recognized using
the preclusion law that the state court in which the rendering federal court sits would
apply, but that in federal question cases federal preclusion law should be used). The
intricacies of the issues raised by these two articles range far beyond the scope of this
Article. It should be pointed out, however, that both positions seem internally inconsis-
tent. If Degnan is correct that preclusion rules are procedural for Erie purposes, they
should also be procedural for full faith and credit purposes. Cf. Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 727-
29 (1988) (matters that are "substantive" for Erie purposes may be "procedural" for
choice of law purposes because Erie's notions of federalism require a more restrictive
notion of what is "procedural"). As for Burbank's thesis, it seems to wish to tie preclu-
sion rules to the underlying cause of action adjudicated. Yet many concepts of preclu-
sion, most notably the idea of claim preclusion, involve the preclusive effect of prior
adjudication on all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. See, e.g.,
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, at 196 (1982) (prior adjudication extinguishes
"all... series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose"). How does one
determine the preclusive effect of a failure to raise a federal claim in a federal court
proceeding based on a transactionally related state-based claim? Burbank's approach ap-
pears to provide an ambiguous answer to the question.
239. 210 U.S. 230, 234-37 (1908). Other aspects of Fauntleroy are discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 144-158.
240. Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 234.
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have effectively barred an enforcement action.241 However, Justice
Holmes was reluctant to read the statute in a way that would withdraw
jurisdiction away from a court of general jurisdiction along substantive
lines.242 He thus recognized that there was a sometimes illusory line be-
tween substance and procedure and was reluctant to allow arguably pro-
cedural rules to have such large substantive effects.
5. Jurisdictional Defects
Confusion characterizes the rules that control when a court of recogni-
tion may examine the court of rendition's jurisdiction over the subject
matter or over the parties to a prior judgment. In general, if the jurisdic-
tional issue was raised in the prior proceeding, it may not be raised in the
court of recognition. Moreover, even if not raised in the prior proceed-
ing, parties to the prior action may not raise the jurisdictional issues in
the recognition action if they appeared in the prior action. This appears
to leave the door open for parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the
court of rendition if they do not appear in the prior action.
Although this approach developed as a full faith and credit princi-
ple,24 it can now also be viewed as a due process problem. 2" Thus, a
judgment rendered by a court without affording the litigant notice of the
action can now be attacked collaterally within the state of rendition. It
therefore does not constitute an exception to the full faith and credit stat-
ute at all. More problematic is the situation in which notice and an op-
portunity to be heard is given, but the party chooses not to appear,
claiming that the court is exceeding its jurisdiction on either statutory or
constitutional grounds. In those circumstances, the state of rendition
could forbid collateral attack without violating due process.245 The only
reason to permit the court of recognition to examine the jurisdictional
issue in that case would appear to be that the federal system's interest in
fairness and state sovereignty outweighs any full faith and credit interest
in finality.
241. See id. at 234-35.
242. See id. at 235.
243. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729 (1877) (full faith and credit clause
governs enforcement of judgments in states other than rendering state).
244. See id. at 729-33. Before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the United
States Constitution did not directly impose due process constraints on the states. Full
faith and credit thus become a vehicle of imposing minimum standards on the quality of a
judgment entitled to be recognized. After the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
judgments no longer needed to be attacked collaterally, as due process objectives could be
raised directly in the initial proceeding. See id. at 733. ,
245. It could be argued that it violates due process if a court enforces a default judg-
ment in the face of a jurisdictional challenge on the theory that the defendant had not
gotten her "day in court." This analysis is too simplistic, however. All due process has
ever required is an opportunity to be heard. Thus, asstming that the defendant had
received notice and was given an opportunity to be heard, the fact that the defendant
chose not to appear is of no constitutional significance. To hold otherwise would render
all default judgments vulnerable, as well as eliminating the use of merger and bar.
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The full faith and credit analysis is shown by Pennoyer v. Neff.2 46 At
issue in Pennoyer was whether a federal court was required to give full
faith and credit to an Oregon state court judgment adverse to Neff.2 47 A
plain reading of the full faith and credit statute would require that the
federal court give the prior state court judgment the same preclusive ef-
fect as the Oregon state court would. The Pennoyer Court, however,
took a radically different approach to the problem. After acknowledging
that a literal reading of the statute might require recognition of the ear-
lier judgment, the Court stated that this reading had been "qualified." 248
The statute was deemed to apply only "when the court rendering the
judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter."249
The Pennoyer approach acknowledges that state interests can some-
times supercede preclusion values. It ensured that "[a] state's paramount
interest in determining the legal status of its citizens and the ownership
of property within its boundaries could not be usurped by another state's
judicial proceedings."25 0
Not only did Pennoyer deviate from the plain reading approach, but it
did so by interposing a federal standard for jurisdiction.251 Unlike other
issues of preclusion, in which either the law of the state of rendition or
the law of the state of recognition would apply, the question in Pennoyer
of whether the prior judgment was of a sufficient quality to merit recogni-
tion was determined by a federal standard. This is true even though, at
that time, the state of rendition would be free to recognize its prior
judgment.25 2
6. Domestic Relations
In the domestic relations area, the Supreme Court has fashioned a set
of rules of recognition, presumably under the full faith and credit and
due process clauses, that is inconsistent with the normal rules of in per-
sonam or in rem jurisdiction. The general rule is that a court has per-
sonal jurisdiction over the parties to a divorce action if either party is a
246. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
247. See id. at 721-22.
248. Id. at 729.
249. Id.
250. Smith, supra note 6, at 86.
251. The Pennoyer Court did not consider whether the initial suit was commenced
against Neff in conformity with the Oregon Code, but, instead, focussed on whether exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over Neff conformed with "principles of public law." Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
252. Pennoyer arose before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, and thus, there
was no due process constraints on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. State courts,
however, did not consider themselves unconstrained with regard to the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction. States might well have adopted limits on the exercise of personal juris-
diction based on principles of international law or as a result of due process provisions in
state constitutions. What is notable about Pennoyer, therefore, is the desire to interpose a




domiciliary in the state in which the court sits."' 3 As in personal juris-
diction generally, appearance in an action precludes collateral attack of
personal jurisdiction in a subsequent action.254 However, if a party
chooses not to appear in the first suit and seeks to attack collaterally the
judgment on a personal jurisdiction basis in the second suit, collateral
attack is permitted. The standard, however, is not based on the state of
rendition's jurisdictional rules, but on an independent assessment of
domicile. In formulating this standard, the Court did not accept that the
state of rendition had "unquestioned authority, consistent with proce-
dural due process, to grant divorces on whatever basis it sees fit to all
who meet its statutory requirements.
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Although couched in standard terminology of jurisdiction and due
process, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that divorce cases are dif-
ferent from general civil litigation and that the rules of preclusion are
being manipulated to accommodate the concerns of competing states and
to protect the interests of the divorcing parties.2 56 After burying the fic-
tion that divorce actions were actions in rem,2 57 the Court was unwilling
to view divorce actions as pure transitory in personam actions.2 58 In-
stead, the Court, under the guise of the full faith and credit clause, set
forth a "jurisdictional" standard for the validity of divorce decrees.259
253. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942).
254. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 (1948).
255. Williams, 325 U.S. at 239 (Murphy, J., concurring).
256. Professor Smith has commented:
The Supreme Court's treatment of "migratory" divorce decrees is a good exam-
ple of the manipulation of the common-law jurisdiction concept. Although ra-
tionalized as a jurisdictional issue, the refusal to give preclusive effect to another
state's divorce decree has been premised on concern that full faith and credit
would interfere with the forum state's right to determine the matrimonial status
of its own domiciliaries.
Smith, supra note 6, at 87 (footnote omitted).
257. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297-302 (1942). Traditionally, an
action for divorce could be brought only in the state of the marital domicile. Because of
problems in ascertaining the matrimonial domicile in situations where the spouses had
established separate domiciles in different states, the rule was altered to allow suit in the
domicile of either spouse. See id.
258. See id. at 297. The Court might have been concerned, in part, with the problem
of obtaining personal jurisdiction over a spouse anywhere but in the spouse's domicile.
The problem of personal jurisdiction might have been addressed through the crafting of
appropriate long arm statutes. See generally International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945) (personal jurisdiction may be asserted over non-resident defendant as
long as the defendant has sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it
reasonable and just to permit the state to enforce the obligations which the defendant has
incurred there). But see Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (California domi-
cile of wife and children not a sufficient contact to subject New York husband to suit in
California for custody and child support). The jurisdictional issue, however, seems to
mask concerns of choice of law. Rather than police the substantive choice of law used in
determining the standards for divorce, the Court has limited jurisdiction in such a way
that the forum can always apply its own law. The choice of law approach is raised by
Judge Hastie in Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 685 (3d Cir. 1953) (Hastie, J., dissenting),
vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
259. The standard, that the action be brought in the domicile of one of the parties, see
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This jurisdictional obstacle, however, can be overcome through collusion
of the parties. If both parties "appear" in the action, collateral attack on
the jurisdiction of the first court is precluded because the parties had an
opportunity to litigate the issue in the first proceeding.2 °
The divorce recognition cases thus strike a delicate balance between
the interests of different states and between the interests of the parties.
The parties can, by agreement, bring themselves within the jurisdiction of
any state in which one of them arguably can establish a domicile. If
there is no agreement, a spouse can bring him or herself within the re-
gime of any state, but must first establish a bona fide domicile there,
capable of withstanding independent scrutiny. This accommodates the
bona fide interests of both domiciles in that, in the absence of collusion,
power is only exercised by an interested state; just as in the area of choice
of law, a state should be entitled to apply its own law to a dispute in
which it has an interest. Unlike a pure in personam approach, the ap-
proach taken in divorce recognition cases ensures that the rendering
court has an interest in the outcome.
C. The Thread
If there is a common thread running through the exceptions to the
plain reading approach, it is that preclusive effect may be denied by the
state of recognition when it has a strong state interest in doing so and the
state of rendition lacks an interest in precluding consideration of the is-
sue.261 Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in Thomas is explicit on the
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 300 (1942), is difficult to characterize. It is not
typical of personal jurisdiction rules in that it does not focus on the relationship between
the defendant and the forum. Indeed, it recognizes the power of a state to adjudicate a
divorce as a result of the unilateral action of the plaintiff in establishing a domicile there.
See id. at 301. Nor is it typical of limitations on subject matter jurisdiction, because state
courts are deemed competent, in general, to adjudicate divorces. It is most similar to
either notions of jurisdiction to adjudicate an action in rem or venue in local actions. Of
course, the Court specifically disavowed the in rem analogy. See supra note 257. The
local action analogy is also curious. Not only is the premise of the local action rule-the
idea that certain actions can only be adjudicated in courts with geographic power over
the subject of the suit-presently in disfavor, see Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 220 Ark.
521, 249 S.W.2d 994 (1952), but it is difficult to see why venue should be a matter of
constitutional concern.
260. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 (1948).
261. Other attempts have been made, of course, to explain the exceptions to full faith
and credit in a systematic way. Most prominent is section 103 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws (1971):
A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be recognized
or enforced in a sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not required
by the national policy of full faith and credit because it would involve an im-
proper interference with important interests of the sister State.
This formulation, first suggested by Justice Stone's dissent in Yarborough v. Yarbor-
ough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933), see Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 103, at
314 (1971), was developed in Reese & Johnson, supra note 95, at 156-57, 161, 171-77.
Professor Ehrenzweig has argued that there is "no authority whatsoever for th[is] star-
tling proposition." Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for its
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point;26 2 one can explain most of the other exceptions using the same
rule.
Consider first the "land taboo" cases. The conventional explanation
for the refusal of the state of recognition to enforce judgments affecting
land within its borders-that the state of rendition lacked power to act
on the property-is a weak explanation at best. Assuming the existence
of personal jurisdiction over the parties, the state of rendition has power
to determine all rights to property as between the parties. The state of
recognition is then bound by the judgment. However, the state of rendi-
tion may not, in its enforcement of the judgment, interfere with the prop-
erty recordation system of the state of recognition. Should it do so, it
interferes with valid interests of the state of recognition without further-
ing an interest of its own. Although it might appear that the state of
rendition has an interest in the enforcement of its judgment, this interest
is not implicated because the full faith and credit statute guarantees that
the rights of the parties as adjudicated in the action will be recognized by
the state of recognition.263
Similarly, the interests of the state of recognition in the administration
of its courts justify applying its own rules governing the manner in which
judgments are recognized, even where these rules differ from those of the
state of rendition. Again, the interests of the state of rendition are satis-
fied as long as the state of recognition does not discriminate against the
prior judgment, and as long as the scope of recognition of the prior judg-
ment is determined in accordance with the law of the state of rendition.
The thread develops some knots when it comes to the rules concerning
inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court of rendition. In most situations,
the state of recognition has no particular interest in examining the juris-
diction of the state of rendition. Where the state of recognition enjoys
exclusive jurisdiction, however, examination into jurisdiction is some-
times allowed.264 This rule creates tension if the court of rendition has
also considered the question of jurisdiction-who is right? Given the
Withdrawal, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1230, 1240 (1965); see also Note, Full Faith and Credit to
Judgments: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 282, 284-91
(1966) (opposing Restatement's exception to full faith and credit). The crucial difference
between the Restatement's formulation and this Article's is the requirement of a "false
conflict": not only must the state of recognition have an interest in not recognizing the
judgment, but the state of rendition must also have no interest in having the judgment
recognized. See also Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 176, at 1366 ("most, if not all, of the
persistent deviations from the requirements of the implementing statute can be fairly ana-
lyzed, or at least collected, under the protean rubric of the state-interest exception."); cf.
Shreve, supra note 4, at 1210 ("Section 1738 should be read to leave federal courts free to
apply federal law to augment the preclusive effects of a state judgment whenever doing so
would not frustrate the purpose behind the state's rule of lesser preclusion and would
advance the purpose behind the federal rule of greater preclusion.").
262. See Thomas, 448 U.S. at 285-86.
263. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 10-14 (1909).
264. Cf Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1940) (collateral attack of state
court's subject matter jurisdiction in a case arising under federal bankruptcy law is per-
mitted in federal court).
[Vol. 58
FULL FAITH & CREDIT
lack of a superior answer, it might be sensible to forbid reexamination of
the jurisdictional issue-at least in all but the clearest cases of error.
As to personal jurisdiction and notice, the general rule-that matters
considered in the prior litigation may not be reexamined unless the state
of rendition would allow collateral attack-reflects the fact that the state
of rendition has an interest in the judgment, and that the state of recogni-
tion has no interest in reexamining the issue. The fact that collateral
attack is permitted when claims of deficient notice or lack of jurisdiction
cannot be considered in the prior litigation may be seen more as a matter
of safeguarding the litigant's due process rights than in vindicating any
interests of the state of recognition. Challenges involving jurisdictional
defects may thus be seen as a "creative" use of the full faith and credit
clause which, today, is superfluous because of developments under the
due process clause.
IV. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK
The foregoing discussion suggests that a general rule may be formu-
lated regarding the faith and credit to be afforded to judgments. Judg-
ments should be given the same faith and credit in the state of
recognition as in the state of rendition, unless doing so would adversely
affect the interests of the state of recognition without furthering any in-
terests of the state of rendition.265 In such a situation, the state of recog-
nition may employ a rule that does not discriminate against foreign
judgments. This general framework works no change in the bulk of cur-
rent doctrine. In most situations, states of recognition would continue to
treat judgments in the same way as would the courts of rendition. The
general framework also accommodates most exceptions to full faith and
credit. 66 In a number of areas, however, it departs from at least the
logical implications of current doctrine, with its emphasis on a plain
reading of the full faith and credit statute, in a number of areas. The
discussion now turns to these areas.
A. Legal Determinations Based on the Law of the State of
Recognition
Consider the following not so hypothetical case.267 A and B, both citi-
zens of state X, enter into a contract in State X to be performed in State
265. Cf Shreve, supra note 4, at 1210 (proposing reading of full faith and credit statute
to leave federal courts free to apply federal preclusion rules under certain circumstances);
see also id. at 1218 ("To the extent that federal policies are at stake when federal courts
are called upon to enforce state judgments, it might be reasonable to expect federal courts
to apply their own preclusion doctrine in intersystem cases.").
266. As explained earlier, allowing collateral attack on lack of notice or personal juris-
diction is best seen as a due process concept. See supra notes 243-252 and accompanying
text.




X. B fails to perform under the contract. A then sues B not in State X,
but in State Y, serving A while A is temporarily in the state. The court in
State Y, purporting to apply State X law, finds for A. In a future action
in State X, A argues that the State Y judgment should be recognized. B
resists recognition, claiming that the court in State Y had misapplied
State X law. B prays that all other matters considered by the State Y
court, including all factual determinations, should be considered conclu-
sive in the State X proceeding, but that the State X court should be al-
lowed to reconsider matters of State X law.
Under current readings of the full faith and credit statute, B's prayer
would fall on deaf ears. Because State Y would consider the matter of
State X law to be res judicata, State X must also deem it to be res judi-
cata. Yet it is difficult to understand what objectives of full faith and
credit such a view would further. Certainly, State Y has no interest in
seeing its view of State X law prevail, at least outside of its own court
system. State X, on the other hand, presumably has a strong interest in
seeing that matters decided under its laws are decided correctly. Indeed,
unless such a reexamination is allowed, there is no way to correct errors
made by the State Y court.2 6 s
What accounts for the view that State X may not reexamine State Y's
interpretation of State X law? Certainly, it is not that State Y has an
interest in the determination. At best, State Y has an interest only in the
facts adduced in the adjudication. Although State Y has an interest in
the finality of its judgments, including matters of foreign law, this inter-
est is not implicated when State X resources are expended in relitigating
the matter. But what of the fact of the judgment? Doesn't State Y have
an interest in seeing its judgments enforced simply as a validation of state
power? This argument has considerable intuitive appeal. Yet, it seems
unlikely that State Y would value enforcement of its erroneous judgment
above the interests of State X and the litigants in obtaining a correct
ruling. Thus, one could probably come to the view that State Y would
not want its interpretation of State X law to be binding on State X.269
Because there is no forum interest in precluding relitigation, it is ap-
propriate to consider the problem from the point of view of the prevailing
party. Essentially, A must argue that State Y court's final judgment cre-
ates rights that vest in him. This assumes, of course, the existence of
vested rights in judgments. This assumption is demonstrably false. Ab-
sent the full faith and credit clause, judgments would be recognized only
as a matter of comity. Even under the full faith and credit clause, judg-
268. By contrast, errors raising federal issues, such as jurisdiction may be corrected,
theoretically, by seeking Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court is not likely, how-
ever, to accept review of a case in which the error on appeal is one of a state misapplying
another state's law.
269. This is essentially the rationale of the Supreme Court in McCartin. Analytically,
the interest-based approach offered here is more satisfying, just as Stevens' approach in
Thomas is more satisfying.
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ments need only be recognized in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Thus, the
only basis for the vested right is a statutory one, based on a wooden
reading of the full faith and credit statute.270
But is State X discriminating against State Yjudgments? After all, had
a State X court reached the same judgment that the State Y court had,
surely a second State X court would view the matter to be res judicata as
between the parties. The fallacy, of course, lies in the assumption that
the State X court would have rendered the erroneous decision under
State X law. It is conceivable that a State X trial court could commit
such an error, but unlikely that the error could have survived the appel-
late process in State X. Ultimately, B would have obtained a definitive
ruling by State X of State X law. B would have no such opportunity in
State Y courts. Thus, there is no discrimination against the State Y court
judgment because a comparable State X court judgment would be review-
able on appeal; the two situations are not analogous.
Even if State X is not acting in an overtly discriminatory fashion in
redeciding the issue of State X law, it may be destroying the very fabric of
our federated system of justice. State X does seem to single out the State
Yjudgment for special, if not discriminatory, treatment. Can this be jus-
tified by assuming, as we must, that State Y courts are competent to de-
cide issues of State X law? Further, doesn't this send off the wrong
federalism signals to State P Won't State Y be reluctant in the future to
choose State X law to decide disputes? If so, State X may have won the
battle and lost the war because, although it is able to vindicate its inter-
ests in this case, State Y will disregard State X interests in other situa-
tions by refusing to apply State X law.271
These federalism considerations are more problematic and suggest that
State X might wish to exercise some restraint before reexamining State X
law issues. First, State Y is competent to decide State X law issues, and
may in fact be compelled by the full faith and credit clause and the due
process clause to apply State X law to a case.2 72 As in the case of chal-
lenges to the rendering court's subject matter jurisdiction, State X should
give considerable deference to the judgment of State Y's court and pre-
sume correctness. Precisely because of federalism concerns, State X
should be reluctant to reexamine issues decided by the State Y court. It
270. Cf. Note, Intercircuit Conflicts and the Enforcement of Extracircuit Judgments, 95
Yale L.J. 1500, 1513-14 (1986) (proposing that when an intercircuit conflict exists on an
issue of law, the court of recognition is not bound by the conflicting rule of the court of
rendition, but may treat its precedent as an "intervening change" in the law).
271. There is no hard evidence, however, that courts would actually do this. Notions
of comity and fairness to litigants would tend to cause states to adhere to consistent
choice of law rules.
272. State Y might also be able to certify the question of interpretation of State X law
to a State X court. See 17A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 4248, at 168 n.33 (1988) (listing 14 states and one territory that allow courts
from other states to certify questions to the highest court of the state).
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should reexamine the State X law issue only when the equities are
compelling.
One way of measuring the equities is to focus on forum shopping. For
example, in the hypothetical, it appears that A chose State Y as the forum
in order to obtain State Y's interpretation of State X law. In such a case,
the equities favor allowing B to obtain State X's interpretation of State X
law.
Similarly, when the defendant bases her claim on the law of the state of
recognition, she should not be precluded from obtaining a definitive in-
terpretation of the law in a subsequent action in the state of recognition.
Conversely, a losing plaintiff should not be allowed to complain that the
state of rendition's erroneous interpretation of the law of the state of rec-
ognition when the plaintiff selected the forum.
Finally, A might interpose a "reverse due process" argument against
having the State X law issue reheard in State X court. Under this view, it
would amount to a denial of due process for State X to give B another
bite at the apple. This argument, while superficially appealing, is incor-
rect. It would render devices affording relief from judgment, such as
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) unconstitutional. In essence, A
wants to take refuge in State Y's mistake; it cheapens the notion of due
process to allow A to do so under the guise of the due process clause.
Those who resist this view of the case might be more disposed to ac-
cept it if the problem were limited to one of issue preclusion rather than
claim preclusion. For example, suppose that A and B entered into a se-
ries of contracts. Should an adverse determination with regard to one of
the contracts based on a misinterpretation of State X law preclude a State
X court from correcting the mistake with regard to a suit based on an-
other contract? Intuitively, this situation appears to involve less discrim-
ination than the claim preclusion situation. Yet it is hard to see why this
is so, at least when one focuses on the traditional criteria. It might seem
acceptable to allow B to live with the result in a case which she has
litigated and lost. Binding her to that same erroneous result, however,
even in foreseeable future situations, seems to overstep the line of
fairness.
This approach would not lead to unstable judgments. A judgment
may be reopened only if a false conflict existed, and once reopened, it
cannot be subject to further collateral attack unless another false conflict
exists; at most, a limited opportunity for relitigation is presented. Erro-
neous application of the approach, like any other form of error, may be
dealt with by appellate review.273
273. Even under the plain meaning approach, courts can erroneously allow relitigation
of an issue. See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 75-79 (1939) (federal court
must give preclusive effect to the determination of a Washington court that erroneously
allowed relitigation of an issue previously decided by an Idaho court).
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B. Mutuality of Estoppel
Consider the following hypothetical. A, a California citizen, and B, an
Ohio citizen, are passengers in an aircraft owned and operated by C. The
flight originated in Chicago and, while flying over Kansas, en route to
Phoenix, the plane crashes. A sues C in California; B sues C in Ohio.
Each party claims negligence. The airline counters that the crash was
caused by a house that was swept up by a tornado and that, accordingly,
the accident was due to an act of God, in the face of which it had exer-
cised the requisite amount of care in operating the aircraft. Assume first
that the Ohio suit reaches final judgment first, and that judgment is ren-
dered for B. A now seeks to estop C from relitigating the issue of C's
liability in his suit.
Had B's suit against C been lodged in California, A's request for collat-
eral estoppel would seem unproblematic. California has abandoned the
requirement of mutuality of parties for purposes of issue preclusion, even
in the context of "offensive" collateral estoppel.274 However, Ohio still
clings to the mutuality requirement.275 Thus, the question posed is
whether California violates the full faith and credit statute by applying its
own rule of collateral estoppel to the Ohio judgment.
The plain reading approach would dictate that Ohio's rules of preclu-
sion, including its mutuality requirement, be employed in the California
action.276 Yet Ohio certainly has no interest in seeing its preclusion law
applied in California.27 Conversely, California has a strong state inter-
est in the efficient administration of justice and in applying its own law of
preclusion.273
The converse situation presents a more interesting problem. Suppose
the California court renders judgment for A before the conclusion of the
Ohio action. Could Ohio refuse to give the California judgment collat-
eral estoppel effect? Again, the answer is yes. The interest of the render-
ing state in the fair and efficient administration of justice simply does not
apply when recognition is sought in another state. Indeed, it would be
ironic if, under the full faith and credit clause and statute, both Ohio and
California could argue that their own rules of preclusion apply to this
274. See Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813-
14, 122 P.2d 892, 895-96 (1942).
275. See Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 193, 203-04, 443
N.E.2d 978, 987-88 (1983).
276. See Note, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel in Multi-State Litigation: An Evalua-
tion of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 35 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 993, 1000
(1978). But see Note, Collateral Estoppel in Multistate Litigation, 68 Colum. L. Rev.
1590, 1601 (1968) (states have legitimate interest in applying domestic law).
277. Ohio might have an interest in not subjecting B to further liability as a result of
the Ohio judgment if doing so would subject B to unfair surprise. But, California would
likely consider the presence or absence of unfair surprise as a factor in determining
whether to employ nonmutual estoppel and, in any event, B is certainly aware of the
existence of the suit in California when it litigates the Ohio action, and so is on notice of
its possible effect on the California suit.
278. See Casad, supra note 24, at 531-32; Shreve, supra note 4, at 1210.
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case (which probably arose under Kansas law) because such rules are
"procedural" matters for the forum, yet other courts would be bound to
follow such admittedly procedural rules in determining the effect of the
judgment.279
C. Other Procedural Issues
A similar argument could be made with respect to other "procedural"
rules such as rules ofjoinder of claims and parties, and the scope of claim
preclusion. The only difference in conceptual approach would be in the
equities of allowing relitigation.
Consider rules governing counterclaims. Suppose that the court of
rendition has a rule making the joinder of transactionally related coun-
terclaims mandatory and the joinder of other counterclaims permis-
sive.2 8 ° Suppose further that the state of recognition makes all
counterclaims permissive. What should the state of recognition do when
faced with a lawsuit involving an issue that is transactionally related to
the suit in the state of rendition? Surely the state of rendition has no
interest in having its rule of joinder applied in the state of recognition.
The joinder rule reflects a determination by the state of rendition that
disputes are most efficiently resolved in a single lawsuit. The state's in-
terest in efficiency, however, is not implicated if another state wishes to
entertain the suit. By the same token, the state of recognition has no
particular interest in entertaining the claim, except in situations in which
the claim involves the law of the state of recognition. In most circum-
stances, therefore, the equities do not weigh heavily in either direction.281
Assuming, however, that the state of recognition adheres to its own
joinder rule, it does not mean that the judgment in the state of rendition
has no relevance to the suit in the state of recognition. Any issue decided
279. Professor Overton attempts to deal with the dilemma by deeming preclusion part
of the substantive law of the state of recognition. See Overton, The Restatement of Judg-
ments, Collateral Estoppel, and Conflict of Laws, 44 Tenn. L. Rev. 927, 944-45 (1977).
Even if characterization were a useful method of proceeding, in general, in interpreting
the full faith and credit statute, it is difficult to see how preclusion law may be sensibly
referred to as a matter of substantive law. Moreover, if it could be seen as a matter of
substantive law, it would be more likely seen as part of the substantive law of the state
law giving rise to the cause of action. Cf. Burbank, supra note 65, at 799 ("There may be
cases in which the courts of the rendering state would choose to apply the preclusion law
of another state, as where the latter's law furnished the rules of substantive law in the
initial action and the question is who is bound by the judgment in that action.").
280. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a), 13(b).
281. See Carrington, supra note 140, at 390-91 (state of recognition may refuse to rec-
ognize the state of rendition's compulsory counterclaim rule). Professor Carrington re-
lies, in part, on a distinction between the "direct" preclusive effects of a judgment and
"collateral" preclusive effect. See id. at 389. He is more likely to apply the preclusion
law to claims and issues brought by the plaintiff, because she chose the forum, and so
should live by the preclusion rules of the forum; as to matters "collateral" to the initial
action, such as the existence of a counterclaim, the defendant, not having chosen the
forum initially, might not be bound by that forum's rules on joinder. These types of
equitable considerations are discussed at text accompanying notes 284-285.
[Vol. 58
FULL FAITH & CREDIT
in the state of rendition would be binding on the parties in the second
suit. This, however, could have radically different effects on the suit.
For example, consider the situation in which the issue decided in the
original suit is resolved favorably for the defendant. The defendant in
the state of rendition now brings a suit in the state of recognition involv-
ing that issue. If the state of recognition applies the state of rendition's
joinder rule, the original defendant may not raise his claim. However, if
the state of recognition permits the action to proceed, the original de-
fendant may use the prior judgment to preclude relitigation of the issue.
Remedies might raise another situation. Suppose that A has been
killed as a result of B's negligence, and A's estate brings a wrongful death
action in State Y, B's home state. Because the accident occurred in State
X, State Y applies the tort law of State X in the suit. But State Y also
applies its own ceiling on recovery for wrongful death. Should A's estate
be allowed to seek additional recovery in State X?. On the one hand, this
case appears indistinguishable from the workers' compensation cases:
under Stevens' logic in Thomas there should be no bar to further recov-
ery.282 But if the reason that wrongful death ceilings are imposed irre-
spective of the substantive law applied is that such ceilings are
procedural, State Y would have no interest in precluding further recovery
in State X.
Similarly, consider a suit dismissed in State X because the suit is
deemed time-barred under State X's statute of limitations. If the same
suit is brought in State Y and State Y would apply its own statute of
limitations, could State Y entertain the suit? Again, under State X pre-
clusion law the suit would be barred. But this appears to make little
sense, as State X has no interest in precluding suit.283
282. Indeed, this very point troubled Justice White and caused him to take a more
narrow approach to the workers' compensation problem-adherence to the McCartin/
Magnolia distinction. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 287-88
(1980) (White, J., concurring).
283. The Restatement also arrives at the same result, although its reasoning is shaky at
best. The Restatement conceives of the problem as one of issue preclusion, not claim
preclusion, so that State Y would only be precluded from relitigating whether State X's
statute of limitations had expired. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 110
(1971). This view is difficult to reconcile with notions of claim preclusion. If one adopted
this approach more generally, the litigation of a cause of action under State X law would
only preclude relitigation of issues determined in the course of adjudicating the cause of
action. So, limitations on recovery on account of motorist guest statutes or wrongful
death ceilings would only give rise to preclusion on the issue of the applicability of those
statutory provisions of the state of rendition and would not preclude litigation of the
amount of recovery based on the law of the state of recognition. In other words, isn't the
defense of statute of limitations every much an issue going to the merits as any other
issue, giving rise to preclusion of reconsideration of that issue? In any case, why couldn't
State X conceive of the problem of statute of limitations as one of claim preclusion and
not one of issue preclusion? If it did so, the Restatement approach would be in conflict
with the plain meaning approach with its emphasis on treating preclusion matters in the
state of recognition in the same manner as the state of rendition would.
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D. The Role of Comity and Equitable Considerations
The preceding discussion has assumed in large part that full faith and
credit is concerned with state and federal interests and not directly with
the rights of litigants to recognition of a particular judgment or law. It
also emphasized the interests of the forum's judicial system in preclusion
decisions. This is not to say that a state is required to apply its own
preclusion law when the state of rendition is not offended by the applica-
tion of the preclusion law of the state of recognition. In the interests of
comity, the state of recognition might well decide to apply the preclusion
law of the state of rendition. Alternatively, the state of recognition might
use equitable considerations to determine whether to apply its own pre-
clusion law. For example, it might deem a party who chose the state of
rendition to have "waived" the right to have a more lenient rule of pre-
clusion applied to it. 84 The point of rejecting a bright-line rule of preclu-
sion is not to create less preclusion but to allow courts of recognition
more flexibility in dealing with judgments of sister states. As long as
there is no discrimination in treatment of such judgments,285 there is no
reason that courts of recognition should not be able to develop preclusion
rules that sensibly balance the interests of the state of recognition, the
state of rendition and the parties.
CONCLUSION
A plain reading of the full faith and credit statute simplifies the full
faith and credit problem.286 But at what cost? This Article has argued
that the case law in the intersystem preclusion context recognizes that a
plain reading of the full faith and credit statute is not always desirable.
The policies arguing in favor of the plain reading, principally uniformity,
should give way to an overriding state interest of the state of recognition
when federalism principles are not offended by doing so. In fact, such an
approach furthers federalism values. If this approach were to be system-
atically applied, most cases of intersystem preclusion would continue to
be decided according to the preclusion law of the state of rendition and
most of the "exceptions" to full faith and credit would remain un-
changed. However, there will be some cases, such as the Fauntleroy situ-
ation and mutuality of estoppel cases, which could be decided differently.
Simplicity does have its virtues. Simplicity, however, was not the
guiding principle behind the structure of our systems of government. A
Constitution that demarcates roles for a federal government and for state
governments, which divides the power of the federal government into
three branches, and which envisions a system of federal and state courts
284. See Carrington, supra note 140, at 384, 389.
285. See Brilmayer, supra note 65, at 100.
286. But see Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,
379-87 (1985) (court of recognition to apply preclusion law of the court of rendition, even
when court of rendition has no clear rule of law on point).
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with overlapping jurisdiction, is not a document of simplification. The
design of the United States is one of accommodating the disparate inter-
ests of the states and of the federal government. The full faith and credit
clause, one of the few parts of the Constitution to regulate explicitly the
relation among states, and the full faith and credit statute, which imple-
ments the clause, should reflect this idea of accommodation and federal-
ism. This may make the status of judgments somewhat uncertain and
could generate more work for the judicial system as a whole. But, who
ever said that our system of government is simple or efficient? Would we
have it any other way?

